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South America Strelok 01/25/2023 (Wed) 03:51:01 No.46647
Sleepy, mothballed militaries on this continent often only get to see action during civil unrest and the occasional coup d'état. Studying them is interesting if you want to see how Third World militaries cope with alienation from society and a lack of a clear enemy. And coping in general. The Brazilian Army has large troop numbers compared to its neighbors, but not as much of a numerical advantage when counting military hardware. It has a gargantuan territory to cover with motorized, jungle, light, border, etc. infantry. Brigades have to spread out their battalions, but this isn't just by the length of the border and coastline, brigades deep into the heart of the country do it too. Conscripts have to serve close to where they live, and officers still believe in molding and educating the unwashed masses through conscription. The Army is the only service with a substantial number of conscripts. Some say there'd be enough volunteers to abolish conscription. For the past couple decades, Army strategists have devised several schemes splitting their force between mostly professional, high-readiness brigades and outdated brigades only meant to process conscripts. There's supposed to be a reserve, but nobody's sure if a true mobilization would work. All motorized infantry is set to be mechanized with the locally-assembled Iveco Guarani, but that's gonna take many years. The cavalry's older Urutu APCs have already been replaced. Its Cascavels will be replaced by Centauro IIs by a contract signed last month. Some of them will also be locally assembled and there's a degree of parts commonality with the Guarani; furthermore, Argentina is now set to also use Guaranis, which might give the defense industry some economy of scale. Leopard 1s will serve as far as 2040 and I haven't heard of any replacement for the M-113s which are supposed to follow them. The Air Force's Gripens are very early on in their replacement of earlier F-5s. The Navy "has" an aircraft carrier because they designated their helicopter carrier (Atlântico, formerly the HMS Ocean) as a "multipurpose aircraft carrier". Which they only use for helicopters anyway. They still have about ~5 carrier-capable Skyhawks so they can take off from a nonexistant carrier and, aided by nonexistant AEW aircraft, dogfight at sea with their guns. I've read in some of their material that the Atlântico's Artisan system could still guide the Skyhawks, but how much would this be useful without AEW aircraft? Please tell me.
There's a brigade of heliborne infantry, but aviation battalions don't have enough transport capacity to haul even a single battalion in one go. And that's before factoring in that maintenance is meant to keep 70% operational at any given time and it's often less. It's simply normal for Brazilians to have a lot of nonfunctioning equipment. There's also an entire reinforced brigade (4 maneuver battalions instead of 3) of mountain infantry, on a country with no active tectonics or snowcapped heights. Though it's not that bad, there are plenty of heights for them. I guess higher-ups just wanted more light infantry so they'd need to order less APCs.
>>46647 >>46648 What do you think about the recent Neocommunist World Order (NWO) coup d'état in Brazil after Bolsonaro cucked/was-traitor (he said he wouldn't leave office unless killed)?
>>46657 To be more specific, is there any chance of a civil/separatist war in Brazil?
>>46657 >>46658 stop shitting up threads with your schizo nonsense
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>>46669 Shut up you chango, let them talk i want to read entertainment >>46657 >coup d'état in Brazil That silly parade cannot be considered a CdE by itself, same with the murrican park walk in the capitol that many of us saw live on streaming, but something happened that makes me believe it was a classic Sao Paolo Forum tactic: A hyped fake small unrest that makes reactionaries jump out to the opportunity and get culled, aka a self-coup. A similar event happened in Venezuela, the media hyped a lot a civil unrest (with many of its participants being gov agents in civilian attire) who were shooting some others although the total actual participants were less than 20, it snowballed into massive hundred of thousands civilians marching around against the commies. The military who were against the then-president Chavez then brew a quick plan with their peers, detained him and all of the sudden the loyalists revealed themselves and started detaining each others, this led to the old guard running out to the exile ASAP to avoid being court marshaled and others being done just that but in secret. The President was then freed, the controversy surrounding his forfeiting of powers and so on while cuffed is still debated to this day, but still he made a warning speech to others to buzz off. Due to this the guy culled most of the opposing factors in the military which included tons of specialists, pilots and high-ranks who were opposing vets of Chavez' own CdE a decade before. The national police also got knocked, for example the leader of the bolice special forces (most famous for that one hostage situation where the kidnapper got sniped in the eye) got canned for allowing the marches to continue despite him saying it was impossible to stop it; also most of the jet fighters' pilots defected to the US so very few could fly them. It was so bad that the famous rumour that Chavez had to bring cuban military personnel to fill the gaps and keep culling people internally didn't seem too farfetched, that seemed to be confirmed by most who had a spell in the army and sought refugee in other countries in the next years. As a side note Venezuela pre-gommies seems to be a decent example of study, somewhat isolated aside from OPEC partners who had few elements but mostly trained above-average compared to the context, and their academy was basically a college with potent ideological bias to every side which is probably why they splintered easily in the unrest and also why the country had 7 CdE's in less than a century. In Brazil nothing much happened after the monke horde strolled in the Niemeyer buildings but Lula chopped the commander of the armed forces, if that continues then it basically is a culling which in turn might raise suspicion of a self-coup because for brazilians they sure did very little damage to the capital's main strip. And to be fair it stinks because the main reason of the protests, according to the official narrative and media, was to poke the military's wattle and do something. Brazilians are between the wall and the sword, a foro gommie with prison time or a zog puppet who backtracked tons of ideas. Still, most importantly, how is dis wepon
>>46676 >how is dis wepon monke militaries is wepon
>>46676 Yeah I always knew Bolso was a ZOG appeaser, but like Trump some had hopped he would challenge the plandemic-era NWO policies (vax pass, essentially mandatory GMO injections, ect). The CdE I was referring to was the stolen election itself with the NWO having rescued Lula from prison as their puppet. Him ordering the silly parade (post Bolso cucking) opposition to get forced (((vaxxed))) definitely reveals his nucom alignment as opposed to just being a traditional comie. But yeah, mass democracy is an illusion because even if the elections aren't rigged the people are easily manipulated by media that is controlled by global central banking elites and their pawns. >>46669 >any non NWO approved narrative is 'conspiracy theory' or 'schizo' <Welcome to the fucking Orwellian brave new world m80.
>>46658 There's already the drug war, Brazil scrapes 60 thousand homicides in particularly bad years. You might remember pictures of the Army and marines occupying favelas in the early 2010s. But it's not taken seriously as a counterinsurgency, so it changes little. Even when cartels do get expelled, they're just replaced by militias. But civil war because of Bolsonaro isn't happening, southern separatism is a meme and NGO-fuelled indigenous separatism won't happen under a government so friendly to NGO backers. >>46676 >the main reason of the protests, according to the official narrative and media, was to poke the military's wattle and do something. The rioters were delusional for still believing the military would do somethig. They're useful idiot boomers who stood in front of military bases for two months after the election "trusting the plan" and believing Bolsonaro's military coup was just about to happen in the next 72 hours. And even after Bolsonaro turned out to be the pussiest president in Brazilian history, enough of them remained to try this chimpout. >if that continues then it basically is a culling That's already happening, they're blaming the military and police for being too lenient with the chimpout and this justifies the purge. Lula is even thinking of a National Guard, which would be the Army's nightmare as they'd lose their grip on internal security. Take a look at the Planalto Military Command, in the media there's already talk of the commander's replacement. Curiously, this command has long been held by a division general rather than an army general as other geographic commands, but there's a valid military reason, it only has a handful of forces. Outside Brasília lie the Special Operations Command and 3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade. Only the former is politically relevant, as it's the country's chief counterterrorism force. Bolsonaro's former aide was set to assume command at the 1st Commando Battalion, but has just been prevented from doing so. Relevant formations inside Brasília are the Army Police battalion, Presidential Guard Battalion and 1st Guard Cavalry Regiment. The later two are best known for their honor guards, but their actual use is as riot troops. This means there are three entire battalions of riot troops guarding the seat of federal power. The presidential guard's commander, who was lethargic in his reaction to the chimpout, has already been sacked. Also worth noting the Air Force's best interceptors are meant to be near Brasília.
>>46657 >>46658 Shush you can't say anything like that or you're a niggurpeel skit so.
>>46713 Heh, I'm just happy this place don't immediately ban me for not approving of the NWO. No doubt shills/bots/sheeple-bots are active on websites/boards that have serious traffic and allow uncensored discourse.
>>46710 >But civil war because of Bolsonaro isn't happening, southern separatism is a meme and NGO-fuelled indigenous separatism won't happen under a government so friendly to NGO backers. Whites/non-GMO-humans appear doomed in Brazil as well unless that changes TBH.
>>46733 Honestly surprised that a country with a recent history as rocky as Brazil didn't offer more resistance to the WEFkikes. It was expected that the European and Canadian governments would immediately sell out implying they weren't in on it but South America has traditionally been much less soy infused. There's still a possibility for uprising but you can't trust national or even regional leaders to step forward and take charge of it, it seems.
This is a mechanized cavalry platoon. "VTL Rec" are simple unarmored jeeps, one for the commander and four scouts. "VBR (M)" is an armored car, currently the Cascavel, to be replaced in the next 15 years by the Centauro II. "VBTP" is an APC (formerly the Urutu, now the Guarani), one is for infantry ("mechanized fusiliers") and one for an 81 mm mortar. Engesa's Jararaca project could've given the jeeps an armored replacement in the past, but it was a flop. I'm not sure about this table, how normal is it to have armor, infantry, scouts and fire support all in the same platoon as the standard, peacetime organization? Theoretically squadron (i.e. company) commanders can rearrange their elements into pure armor, infantry, etc. platoons when needed.
>>46737 Canada and the EU are basically NWO home-territory. Canada has been like a UN/NWO colony since Trudeau the Elder was their puppet. Although Canada's central bank was taken over much later than in the US... the 1970's if I remember correctly. >>46750 I suppose because counter-insurgency is the primary utility of the Brazilian armed forces for the NWO, having something of everything in a unit is the best deployment? Not sure though.
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>>46816 >I suppose because counter-insurgency is the primary utility of the Brazilian armed forces for the NWO For any order, really. Doesn't matter if it's for plantation barons or transnational elites, historically officers dream about running a respected conventional force and find themselves just quelling internal unrest on behalf of the social order. What's curious is that for a long time, dissident officers themselves were the source of unrest. >having something of everything in a unit is the best deployment? Mechanized cavalry is the worst example for this, along with armored cavalry (a combined arms armor/mechanized infantry force for brute offensives, it's what Americans call armor, not what they call mechanized cavalry) it's completely geared towards conventional warfare. All mechanized cavalry brigades are on thinly populated steppe borderlands. Their dependence on wheeled armor makes them very impractical for mountains and jungles. As you can see, each squad has only about 8 foot infantrymen. For internal unrest, you're better off looking into the Army Police's riot troops (though they're far less numerous than the main police, which is militarized and run at the state level) and the paratrooper-jungle infantry-special forces class, which is historically related. Paratroopers nowadays are just conventional, except for their pathfinder elite, but the other two would be prime counterinsurgency forces. What's curious is that they learned from the Araguaia Guerrilla War that to fight a guerrilla, you must become the guerrilla; and beyond that, they now consider the hypothesis of themselves becoming an insurgency to fight off against a great power invasion (like Euros invanding to "protect natives"). Hence, special forces would use their knowledge of stealth and infiltration to organize an insurgency from local jungle populations. It would be a dramatic inversion of their role shielding whoever's in power, but it's a wild fantasy.
>>46832 Most of Brazil is jungle or cleared jungle (like African safari). So I would imagine the focus should be on Air power followed by high mobility mechanized ground forces for the safari and airborne 'ranger' commandos (basically rambo) for the jungle. The only external invasion force I can see would be the NWO itself (EUSSR/NATO) if say Bolso had fought fire with fire and rigged the election so he would win instead. Alternatively, if the PRC goes to war against the NWO, they might attempt an invasion of South America but only after completely defeating the USSA in the pacific.
>>46837 The other option is if the PRC manages to capture a country in South America through NWO-like tactics. China could then move forces to that country and use it as a beach head for expanding Triad influence or as a proxy-state for the South American invasion. E.G the CCP captures the leadership of Peru and proceeds to flood the country with PLA soldiers and weapons in the name of keeping the peace, if a justification is even needed. The NWO would eventually react and cut transportation links from the Chinese mainland and Peru, but the Chinese could have enough time to destabilize the whole region. Of course, this relies on the PRC not being NWO and being expansionist.
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>>46837 >Most of Brazil is jungle or cleared jungle (like African safari). So I would imagine the focus should be on Air power followed by high mobility mechanized ground forces for the safari and airborne 'ranger' commandos (basically rambo) for the jungle. That's true for the Amazon, Brazil's intended defense is by watching the border with forward platoons and aerial detection; reacting with interceptors and light infantry specialized in jungle survival and infiltration; providing mobility with boats, helicopters and transport aircraft; and reinforcing with paratroopers and special forces brought from halfway across the country. But equipment falls far short of these ideas. The "safari" only applies to the central savannah (most of which has been replaced with soybean and maize fields), that's where the 4th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade is stationed, they could probably mop the floor with the Paraguayan Army in open battle on their own. Core Brazil is made of gargantuan cities (where any civil war would be decided) and agriculture, with hilly terrain crossed by some mountain ranges and little remaining native vegetation. There's an urban warfare training center near São Paulo. Northeast Brazil is similar on the coast, but the hinterland is a hostile, thorny shrubland. There's one battalion specialized for this terrain, but it's unlikely to ever see conventional combat. A coastal invasion, either towards the core or to the northeast (a strategic position in the Atlantic), sounds unlikely, superpowers could do it but it's easier for them to just subvert the country and foment a coup. Southern Brazil has good tank terrain at the Argentine/Uruguayan border, but relations have been friendly for decades, there's no reason to concentrate most of the Army's power there, and yet the generals still think like it's 1923. Insurgents spilling over from nearby countries make for a very plausible scenario because it has happened before with the FARC. In 1991 they even attacked a border post, provoking massive retaliation.
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If there's every any kind of guerilla-style civil war in Huezil I don't see how the government could win. There's so much land to cover, all of it dense rainforest, that as long as any guerilla keeps being a pain in the dick and attacking the cities/infrastructure it will bring the whole country into chaos, more so than it already is.
>>46895 >dense rainforest >cities/infrastructure Pick one, you either get the empty Amazon or the 90% deforested economic core.
>>46906 There are cities with infrastructure and dense jungles in Brazil why would someone have to pick one? Did you misunderstand?
>>46914 You can't attack the cities and infrastructure from the jungle like Mexican strelok seemed to suggest. The real fight would be in the Rio/São Paulo suburbs and Vietcong LARPers would be stuck halfway across the continent.
>>46914 It's like saying you can attack California from Louisiana, anon. At worst a no man's land would form on the outskirts. The forested and deforested areas of Brazil are fairly demarcated like how the United States has the 100th Meridian separating humid and arid regions.
>>46937 >>46938 Oh ok, so there aren't any reliable ways to do a hit and run attack. Never mind.
>>46895 It would heavily depend on that guerrilla's leadership, for example in Mexico the oaxaca/chapameco insurgency was squashed in a month via special forces' raids (local GAFE and cooperative Kaibiles) because the dumbasses had reunions with everyone of importance in a single spot, they got snitched and in two operations the government basically decapitated the whole thing to the point they have been going around like a headless chicken for 25+ years inside that very dense and mountainous forest. The timing of their insurgency was suspicious but gommunism aside they had a point, which was NAFTA being shit and the central government wanting to force the elimination of state education in favor of a monolithic brainwashing federal education. But BR anon is correct, the dense forest is far from the urban areas, i don't know how's the agriculture composition in Brazil because our local gommies did pose a menace to the hinterland production but in Brazil the rainforest is so massively dense and quite in the west and north of the country i don't know if it is even used to grow stuff in an organized way. >>46938 >It's like saying you can attack California from Louisiana I mean you kinda can as California has been living with only subsidized water, you can attack a desalination plant here in Mexico and a town in Cali will become dry overnight. Our state government practically blackmailed Arizona and California because of that, hence their panic when russian tourists came to visit that very specific little town with the plant some years ago :^)
>>46647 Something that always stuck out to me about south american/third world armed forces is they seem to be entirely separate from their governments. They’re not under the command of the government, but rather operate independently. It seems like this is part of why coup attempts are so common.
>>46737 The average south american is an 88iq glorified monkey that just does whatever the person with the biggest dick in the room tells them to. It’s why they swing between communism and fascism over and over. >help me win the coup and I personally will kill all the foreigners owning the means of production >help me win the coup and I personally will kill all the communists that stand in the way of us competing with the first world Back and forth it goes.
>>47002 Race didn't ruin South America, Socialism did. Specifically National Socialism in Brazil's case.
>>46942 The Araguaia Guerrilla War is funny, and a case of an incompetent insurgency meeting, after several tries, a brilliant counterinsurgency. <100 Maoists hid in the jungle, this was the biggest ever rural communist insurgency - you can see none of them were on a FARC scale. The local population was friendly but realized they were very intellectualized people from far away and saw throug their attempts at blending in. The insurgency never took roots to self-replicate on a lasting base of popular support, it could be taken out by simply killing the Party members, they had local collaborators but wouldn't replenish their numbers. And yet the first counterinsurgency offensives, with huge numbers of conventional troops, were useless shows of force. Military casualties were very low but conventional commanders didn't even know where the guerrillas operated. Then the troops were withdrawn and intelligence agents infiltrated in the area, disguised as merchants and other individuals. The glowies compiled information on the entire Party structure. Guerrilla-style special forces teams (callsigns, no identification on uniforms, good understanding of the jungle, etc.) were then deployed to hunt down the guerrillas, while iron-fisted curfews were imposed on the civilian population. Insurgents were captured, tortured for information and executed. After their leaders fell, the rest were disorganized. Very few managed to escape, and some of those who did were also killed on a raid against a Party meeting in São Paulo. Maoism was completely annihilated, the Party's survivors turned into generic leftist organization. >>47001 >Something that always stuck out to me about south american/third world armed forces is they seem to be entirely separate from their governments. They’re not under the command of the government, but rather operate independently. It seems like this is part of why coup attempts are so common. Theoretically not true with Brazil's civilian-run Ministry of Defense, but it's recent (1999). Historically each Armed Forces branch had its own Ministry, almost always selected among their own officers, and had a considerable degree of independence. There were also strong interservice rivalries. Officers still form castes with opaque, self-contained professional activities and social lives. At least in the Army, officers are mostly drawn from sons of officers. In the past the institution had more prestige but nowadays few in the population's higher IQ segments venture into an Army career. It's far from a dominant caste, they have to cling on to what privileges they still have, a decade ago they were respected but at present there's a strong anti-military feeling. What stops coups is that the average officer is an apathetic fence-sitter who wouldn't be rebellious even if he wanted to because he cares far more about not bothering his superiors and losing his chances of career progression. Even in the past, 90% of them were like this, they just got dragged along by revolutionary minorities at some points. Civilian-military separation was a source of coups, but not because of bureaucratic autonomy, higher-ups were usually loyal. It's because officers thought they were more meritocratic and moral than civilian elites (this, back when they still attracted talents). And later on in the 20th century, when they thought industrial development, internal order and the Army's interests were all connected and had to be run by the same people (themselves).
>>47053 socialism and simplistic nationalistic rhetoric forced down from the government heads have doomed most of Latin America to take bad series of terrible choices from the middle of the 20th century to this day
Feel for you OP, effort posting while everyone else in this thread so far has been utterly retarded. What can you tell me about the military industrial capacity of Brazil? In case of war, would they be able to produce a lot of new equipment? How does Brazil military industrial capacity compare to that of its neighbors?
>>47183 >What can you tell me about the military industrial capacity of Brazil? It used to be formidable for a Third World country, but much of it deindustrialized in the 90s. Brazilian armored cars, APCs and rocket artillery were widely used in the Iran-Iraq war and remaining vehicles were fighting Isis just a few years ago. Some large items can still be produced locally: KC-390 transport aircraft by Embraer, Super Cougar helicopters by Helibras, Tamandaré-class frigates by ThyssenKrupp South America, Astros MRLS by Avibras, Guarani APCs and soon, Centauro IIs by Iveco. Degrees of foreign technology vary from locally-produced foreign designs to local designs relying on foreign technology (itself, either produced locally or imported) for critical components (e.g. the KC-390 is said to be 60% national, but its engines have to be imported). The Navy has a nuclear submarine program based on the French Scorpene, the nuclear reactor itself is national, but the project has been dragging on forever. >In case of war, would they be able to produce a lot of new equipment? I guess it couldn't scale up quickly even under ideal conditions, even at its height military industry was only a minor fraction of the industrial economy. Maybe Embraer could because it also produces civilian aircraft. >How does Brazil military industrial capacity compare to that of its neighbors? It's better than any of them except Argentina. Argentine industry wasn't export-focused but got ahead of ours in some aspects and behind in others. In the 80s we had a low tech tank project that never took off (the Tamoyo), while they successfully got a low-tech Marder with a tank turret (the TAM). Their submarine production didn't get as far and they don't have an aircraft company as big as Embraer.
It's over for the former Foch/São Paulo, the Brazilian Navy scuttled it yesterday and it rests beneath five km of water. A Saudi group had made a last-minute offer to buy it, but at this point it was taking in so much water it'd just sink on its own if it had to be towed to another continent.
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>>46648 i did some training with the 5th regiment last year. they were pretty cool guys. it was pretty obvious that they didnt get nearly enough money though. their main building was collapsing and they managed to break out a whole 6 helicopters to move our entire company into the AO. the heli's in your pic are honestly pretty solid. definitely a better ride than a blackhawk with more troop space and much more utility for a utility helicopter lol. they buy them from the frogs iirc. the IA2 was pretty cool and nearly all of their troops seemed to have them. their mortar's and doctrine is kinda terrible though.
>>47053 As early as 1820 commentators in south america were saying that the whole continent was doomed to just being a revolving door of dictators because the local population was too stupid to create a functional american or european style democracy. I think it was Simon Bolivar himself (one of the most influential men in latin american political history) who said that it was hopeless to expect them to be anything other than second-rate. This was after decades of him being the leader of the revolutionary forces that led much of south america to independence from Spain and Portugal. After years of trying to teach them how to be civilised, he gave up and declared his entire life’s work was wasted on monkeys in suits.
>>47054 In the US, the armed forces are under the direct control of the executive (the US President, though these days the direct power is delegated to the Department of Defence for day-to-day operations. The DoD is still made up of people appointed by the president, though). The idea of the military outright defying the government is unthinkable as a result, because all of the high command not only takes orders from the president but also is mostly appointed by him and is thus usually people who would be loyal to him. The only way you’d get a military coup is if you could convince lower-level generals to oppose their upper command.

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