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Naval Thread II Strelok 05/02/2022 (Mon) 16:31:42 ID: 48a0ec No.33554
Last thread fell off the board. Discuss and debate naval topics here.
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Over in the WWII thread, a Strelok made the claim the North Carolina could keep a target lock on a ship regardless of what type of evasive maneuvers were being done due to how the gun stabilizers and fire control systems were designed to handle it from the drawing-board. A few months ago, I was watching a video from Drachinifel, during which he mentions this claim and says that the North Carolina could only do this after WWII was over due to post-war fire control equipment upgrades and would not have been able to do that during the war due to those upgrades not being installed. I am not saying either one of them is right or wrong, but is there more information like gunnery test records during WWII that would help clarify that claim? To me it seems like yes the NoCo could have possibly done it, but the stress and possible hull damage it could have caused to the ship make it seem more like a last resort option. Screenshot is of Strelok's comment in question and the video clip is the relevant part of Drachinifel's video.
>>33556 >Drachinifel If he opens his mouth on any ship type that isn't British, there's a 90% chance he's wrong and a 50% chance he's straight up lying. Hearing him drone about the Bismarck/Tirpitz is especially painful even though I don't even like that class. If you're wanting the test records, I unfortunately don't have those test results on me anymore, hard drive failure. But I got them off the internet in the first place, so they're likely still accessible. That being said, to make a logical argument, the requirements were the MK 38 GFCS (since the first variant of the system was capable of this) and the main turrets having fully stable verticals. Neither system could have been retrofitted onto the ships without extremely obvious work being done. The USS North Carolina received legitimate NO post-war modifications (in the terms of what the navy considered modifications), so there was never any chance for this to have been done. >To me it seems like yes the NoCo could have possibly done it, but the stress and possible hull damage it could have caused to the ship make it seem more like a last resort option. You would be mostly correct, as noted in your referenced post: only the Iowas were actually designed to do it, and even they took damage from it. But engaging in direct combat verses other battleships already was a last resort option for Battleships, so you pretty much pulled out all the stops when you got into it regardless. Stress-related hull damage was the least of your concerns.
>>33596 Clarifying my vitriol, Drach isn't actually that bad, but he tends to allow gross incorrect data into his analysis of basically any other ships and fleets than the UK's as long as it makes the Brits look better. Oftentimes, he'll make statements based on things someone on a video game forum told him years ago despite never attempting to verify the claims.
>>33596 >>33611 > I unfortunately don't have those test results on me anymore, hard drive failure That is unfortunate. I would have like to look over those reports, but I can hunt them down if they are still on the internet. >The USS North Carolina received legitimate NO post-war modifications (in the terms of what the navy considered modifications) I can believe that due to the fact that almost immediately after WWII the Navy's budget was cut considerably and most of the fleet was either mothballed or scrapped. I don't see the Navy at the time deciding to spend a bunch of time, money, and material upgrading a ship that will be almost immediately mothballed then/or scrapped. >But engaging in direct combat verses other battleships already was a last resort option for Battleships, so you pretty much pulled >out all the stops when you got into it regardless. Yea, when you have 12-18in battleship shells hitting you a little bit of stress damage from firing the main guns during extreme evasive maneuvers is far down on the concerns list. However, there is not a lot of pure battleship vs battleship engagements in WWII to draw examples from. If memory serves correct, other than Washington and South Dakota engaging Kirishima during the Guatalcanal Campaign and "maybe" the Battle of Surigao Straight. Other than those two examples, I cant think off-hand of another time when a fast battleship went toe-to-toe with another battleship or equivalent with no air support helping either side with bombing and torpedo attacks. >Clarifying my vitriol, Drach isn't actually that bad, but he tends to allow gross incorrect data into his analysis of basically any other >ships and fleets than the UK's as long as it makes the Brits look better. I agree with your assessment about Drach and, in truth, you should never trust what anything or anyone say as 100% true and use multiple sources to draw your own conclusions. Lots of people just parrot information they see without further researching it. Drach dose make for a good starting point if I need to find out more background information about a British ship or an engagement where the British were heavily involved (Battle of Jutland, Force Z, etc). Lately for me that has been gathering information on various British warships and making a list of which ones I would like to have as a RC model.
Redpill me on the armor belt of a battleship, does it really help or is it just a meme?
>>33669 The belt armor can do an lot depending on the ranges involved in terms of shellfire or the attack profile of a given missile, or it can be a lot of weight that doesn't directly do much. In short, any munition which strikes the side of a armored ship's hull is going to have to defeat the armor belt in order to cause significant battle-killing damage to the ship. If it bypasses the side of the hull, then it's the deck armor's domain. For classical naval engagements, any shellfire from inside of 17,000 yards had a significant chance of hitting the belt, from there to around 22,000 yards and it was in the 50-50 range, beyond that and it was steadily more likely for it to hit deck armor. Most battleship engagements in history happened within that 22,000 yard range. Furthermore, mines and suicide boats tended to impact the sides of the hulls, as well as surface riding torpedoes; so all of these would have to contend with the belt armor in order to penetrate the hull - of course, for a (partially) underwater explosion weapon like this, there is more to it than just the belt armor, but the belt helps. For modern threats, you still have the mines and suicide boats (the USS Stark was saved by a slightly thicker strake of metal, had it been armored like even a Cleveland or Atlanta it would have taken far less damage overall), but you also have sea-skimming side attack missiles. Very few AShMs have the raw power to blast through 5+ inches of steel and still cause significant damage deep enough into a ship to put it out of commission. As to actually 'defeating' the belt armor conventionally (as in not just bypassing it), that is another can of worms that requires a PHD in both Physics and Metallurgy to accurately explain. But suffice to answer your question, it actually helps, but it's not a 100% sure thing and only works against things that target its area (which is a lot more stuff than people seem to think).
>>33673 Is there a point to up-armoring turret roofs with CNTs to protect against ASBMs or are those better dealt by interceptor missiles and/or evasive maneuvering?
>>33673 I guess it's a big can of worms, but in general, how would the armour scheme of a modern ship with supermaterials look like? I mean, something like the good old distributed armour scheme, but the belt and the top armour should have the same thickness, and the superstructure is just one big box that is similarly protected? Or that would be too ridiculous even with nanoplates (even if we ignore the monetary issues)?
>>33694 If you're going to start introducing CNT-based armor, then likely. Assuming we are talking about a battleship or cruiser armed with a heavy gun-based artillery battery. In those cases, the turret roofs are the easiest vulnerability to hit for precision missiles. Of course, directly answering your question, ALL incoming munitions are better dealt with by hard-killing the munition/source or evading it, it doesn't matter if it's an ASBM, and AShM, or a 7.62mm someone is standing on a boat shooting at you with. This is where the old 'Threat Onion' comes into play. For a Warship in the missile age, it is: Don't be Seen (Evade the Threat), Don't be Targeted (Spoof the Threat), Don't be Hit (Kill the Threat), Don't be Penetrated (Block the Threat), Don't be Killed (Survive the Threat). Armor is in the 4th Layer, which is basically the last layer if you're trying to prevent serious damage. Ideally, you defeat the threat on a layer further out on the onion. Of course, something will get through, even if it's just fragmentation. Armor is to protect against that inevitability being the fatal blow. >>33703 You're right, that's a topic that would require entire libraries to actually convey with 100% accuracy; libraries full of books I am not qualified to write. However, in the most general of terms... If you're talking a ship utilizing supermaterials such as CNT nanoplates, it depends on how much you intend to armor and what you are trying to do with that armor. If you're just trying to protect the vitals of the ship in order to prevent a complete loss, then the armor would be boxes around the vitals - much like the all-or-nothing scheme of yesteryear. If your point is to prevent as much crew death as possible, then the armor would essentially be built into the hull and superstructure of the ship - it would look like what the exterior of the ship looks like, just set in a little with internal boxes around the components that must be exposed to the outside (such as radar). This would also prevent a complete loss of the ship, but the ship could be rendered blind, deaf, and dumb by critical hits on the exposed electronics. Strategic weapon systems and heavy gun-based artillery likely would still work however, so if your ship's purpose is throwing strategic munitions at fixed targets, this would likely prevent a mission kill. If you are trying to prevent mission kills for tactical systems (the goal of the armor in yesteryear), you encounter the reason why Modern Navies gave up on armor (aside from the weight). Modern Navies don't see the point in armor because the difficulty in armoring the abundance of externally mounted sensitive electronics such as the massive radar panels that have become bog standard anymore, most of which could easily be destroyed with as little as a hand grenade or the smallest shard of fragmentation. Armoring the Radar is actually possible as well, but armored electronics have to either be 'peek-a-boo' style or mammothian. In either case, their effective power per unit of volume is going to be drastically lower than the exposed type, making the resulting ship a veritable leviathan if you intend for it to have comparable signals/ECM power to the more vulnerable ships. It's entirely possible, though; especially if you're willing to accept more limited sensors on the ship, it would just be extremely expensive and time consuming to build and operate.
>>33627 >However, there is not a lot of pure battleship vs battleship engagements in WWII to draw examples from. There were a few, but you never hear about them because no Americans were involved: >Lofoten >Calabria >Cape Spartivento >Denmark Strait >North Cape There's evidence of battleships doing hard zigzags in every listed action except North Cape (where both sides kept steaming in a straight line to maximize speed).
>>34043 As long as you aren't trying to insinuate that planned and coordinated zig-zag maneuvers are the extreme evasive maneuvers that the post Strelok posted an image of, I'd agree with you on everything except the Battle of Denmark Straight never being heard of - it's literally the most famous Battleship on Battleship(/-cruiser) engagement in history. In most cases, the zig-zags were planned into the fire cycles, holding a zig or zag long enough for the gun and FC to stabilize and then take a shot before turning again. The time they were shifting from zig to zag or vice versa and re-stabilizing was used to watch the fall of shot; considering the 35 to 50 second times of flight at the expected battle ranges , this pretty much allowed them to fire at reasonable accuracy and fire-rate while still having a modicum of unpredictability since every shot the enemy took basically had to guess whether they would zig in or zag out..
Last week the US christened and launched a new Freedom-class LCS. In unrelated news, the current proposed USN budget calls for 9 of the 16 Freedom-class LCSs to be decommissioned early, on the grounds that they are unable to perform their intended role, since the technology and systems that were supposed to be developed for them were complete failures.
>>33704 Too bad we don't go for white elephant flagships anymore, a modern dreadnought would be interesting to see, however impractical.
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>>34269 Instead of throwing $40 billion into a useless shithole like Ukraine, I would much rather use that money to make a modern 100,000 ton super battleship. I would love to see what such a project would come up with on that budget even if it would be modernizing an older design.
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In the event of societal collapse and a failed state how would the merchant vessels and submarines play into it? They could wield a lot of power and autonomy for being able to run away from conflict and make dealings with port towns and become some sort of pillar of power but not too much so because of the fuel they need to restock, being essentially a moving castle with all that entails or sub-society.
>>34644 Just look at navy in sengoku era japan. Every warlord wants you and there is nothing that can stop you or tie you down from just fucking off
>>34344 Problem with that is that politicians can't steal money from that as easily because they still have to produce a battleship while sending money to their favorite jew comedian let's them skim as much off the top as they want since anything they actually send to Ukraine gets hoovered up by the Russians after they either A. Kill all the conscripts as they do some insane suicide charge or B. The Ukies fucking leave it all behind as they all abandon their posts. So nobody can call the politicians out on skimming millions off the top of the "aid" since it will never be seen by western eyes again anyway.
>>34677 It is still fun to imagine what a modern BB would look like with a massive budget to fund it and the logistics chain to support it. Even if in reality most of the money would be skimmed and what you would get is something like a BB version of the Zumwalt or Ford-class carriers. >>34344 I have been looking at that image and I don't know if the person who made it messed up or the Japs had some future replacement for the Type 96 in the works besides their horrible attempt at copying the 40mm Bofors. Anyone else have an idea on what the AA guns might be? Pic is what I think the possible anti-air guns might be.
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>>34701 I'm rather sure that those are meant to be the Bofors copies put into turrets similar to what the Yamatos had for the 25mm guns in their original configuration. These drawings seem to represent what the Japanese would have wanted to build if the war went quite differently so that they don't have to cancel pretty much everything and also manage to unfuck their AAA situation.
>>34701 >>34702 It's important to warn that Tzoli has a very unique take on the what ifs of warship design in that era and has very, very limited understanding of what is or isn't possible in terms of naval architecture. He quite often insists that three-gun or even four-gun turrets could be positioned in locations that they do not have the structural support to be placed, will add turrets to locations that would have to be machinery space, place secondary/tertiary guns in the blast cones the main battery, and so on. You would think he would have developed a sense for these things when he has been doing this as a hobby for 12+ years, but apparently studying even the slightest bit of Naval Architecture is too much for him, but I digress. So, while nice to look at and a starting point of what-ifs, unless directly lifted from extant plans or scuttlebutt of designs, his what-if designs are generally engineering impossibilities from the Strangereal of Warships. Itself not actually a strong negative, it's just something you have to keep in mind.
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Speaking of Japanese ships and guns, it's a bit strange how lazy they were with the secondaries when it came to modernization, especially with the Kongou-class. They pretty much just added 25mm autocannons and 127mm AA guns, and if they needed additional weight or space the solution was to get rid of a pair of casemate guns. Of course they wanted to completely replace them with brand new units, so using these ships in itself was just meant to be a temporary solution, but it still looks quite bad compared to e.g. Tennessee.
>>34705 It was mainly a money, resource, time, and hull count issue. They had a very limited number of hulls and very limited resources while the US wasn't exactly hurting for anything but fuel tankers. They were putting a majority of their resources into new destroyers, and they couldn't afford to take their most effective surface warfare assets off the front line for the amount of time the refits would take. The US on the other hand had a lot of their battleship force knocked out of the fight early, requiring major repairs, so they basically had no reason not to perform the refit while they already had the ships in the docks for repairs.
>>34706 Not to start an argument, but if I understand correctly, they had properly gut their battlecruisers to upgrade their machine, and they also put in quite a lot of work into the superstructures in the 1930s, and that's why I find it a bit strange. It's like they wanted to keep some of the 140mm guns just to have something for anti-surface work, but they also thought that the original 1910s battery was unnecessary at that point. Really, I'd just like to get into the head of whoever was in charge of these rebuilds.
>>34709 During the period the Kongou-class rebuilds were taking place, nobody was doing the kind secondary battery upgrade you're talking about, though. The American refits you're referring to only happened because the war. Pre-war, the US's refits of their battle line basically came down to the addition of small/medium AA (.50cal/1.1in) and 5in/25cal (or 5in/38cal later on) HAA, while nixing casemate guns if they needed additional weight or topside space. Basically the Japanese and the Americans were doing the same exact thing as each other. Incidentally, the British, French, and Italians were also doing basically the same thing during that time period, with new constructing receiving better. Even though it wasn't by any means the best, it was entirely good enough according to the understanding of the time period, they weren't being lazy about it in that regard. Also, aside from the immediate amidships casemates, the casemate mounts that were removed from the Kongou sisters were all at high risk of washing out during inclement weather, rough seas, or high speeds. Basically every navy was welding over those casemates after the advancement of boiler technology took the battle line speed up to 21kts+ from 17kts.
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>>34701 The mounts next to the turret are rocket launchers. I'm more concerned with that non-Euclidian quarterdeck. >>34705 That's because they were refitted in the early 30s, back when truly effective DP guns didn't really exist. Contemporary US rebuilds made the same compromise.

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