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Naval Thread II Strelok 05/02/2022 (Mon) 16:31:42 ID: 48a0ec No.33554
Last thread fell off the board. Discuss and debate naval topics here.
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Over in the WWII thread, a Strelok made the claim the North Carolina could keep a target lock on a ship regardless of what type of evasive maneuvers were being done due to how the gun stabilizers and fire control systems were designed to handle it from the drawing-board. A few months ago, I was watching a video from Drachinifel, during which he mentions this claim and says that the North Carolina could only do this after WWII was over due to post-war fire control equipment upgrades and would not have been able to do that during the war due to those upgrades not being installed. I am not saying either one of them is right or wrong, but is there more information like gunnery test records during WWII that would help clarify that claim? To me it seems like yes the NoCo could have possibly done it, but the stress and possible hull damage it could have caused to the ship make it seem more like a last resort option. Screenshot is of Strelok's comment in question and the video clip is the relevant part of Drachinifel's video.
>>33556 >Drachinifel If he opens his mouth on any ship type that isn't British, there's a 90% chance he's wrong and a 50% chance he's straight up lying. Hearing him drone about the Bismarck/Tirpitz is especially painful even though I don't even like that class. If you're wanting the test records, I unfortunately don't have those test results on me anymore, hard drive failure. But I got them off the internet in the first place, so they're likely still accessible. That being said, to make a logical argument, the requirements were the MK 38 GFCS (since the first variant of the system was capable of this) and the main turrets having fully stable verticals. Neither system could have been retrofitted onto the ships without extremely obvious work being done. The USS North Carolina received legitimate NO post-war modifications (in the terms of what the navy considered modifications), so there was never any chance for this to have been done. >To me it seems like yes the NoCo could have possibly done it, but the stress and possible hull damage it could have caused to the ship make it seem more like a last resort option. You would be mostly correct, as noted in your referenced post: only the Iowas were actually designed to do it, and even they took damage from it. But engaging in direct combat verses other battleships already was a last resort option for Battleships, so you pretty much pulled out all the stops when you got into it regardless. Stress-related hull damage was the least of your concerns.
>>33596 Clarifying my vitriol, Drach isn't actually that bad, but he tends to allow gross incorrect data into his analysis of basically any other ships and fleets than the UK's as long as it makes the Brits look better. Oftentimes, he'll make statements based on things someone on a video game forum told him years ago despite never attempting to verify the claims.
>>33596 >>33611 > I unfortunately don't have those test results on me anymore, hard drive failure That is unfortunate. I would have like to look over those reports, but I can hunt them down if they are still on the internet. >The USS North Carolina received legitimate NO post-war modifications (in the terms of what the navy considered modifications) I can believe that due to the fact that almost immediately after WWII the Navy's budget was cut considerably and most of the fleet was either mothballed or scrapped. I don't see the Navy at the time deciding to spend a bunch of time, money, and material upgrading a ship that will be almost immediately mothballed then/or scrapped. >But engaging in direct combat verses other battleships already was a last resort option for Battleships, so you pretty much pulled >out all the stops when you got into it regardless. Yea, when you have 12-18in battleship shells hitting you a little bit of stress damage from firing the main guns during extreme evasive maneuvers is far down on the concerns list. However, there is not a lot of pure battleship vs battleship engagements in WWII to draw examples from. If memory serves correct, other than Washington and South Dakota engaging Kirishima during the Guatalcanal Campaign and "maybe" the Battle of Surigao Straight. Other than those two examples, I cant think off-hand of another time when a fast battleship went toe-to-toe with another battleship or equivalent with no air support helping either side with bombing and torpedo attacks. >Clarifying my vitriol, Drach isn't actually that bad, but he tends to allow gross incorrect data into his analysis of basically any other >ships and fleets than the UK's as long as it makes the Brits look better. I agree with your assessment about Drach and, in truth, you should never trust what anything or anyone say as 100% true and use multiple sources to draw your own conclusions. Lots of people just parrot information they see without further researching it. Drach dose make for a good starting point if I need to find out more background information about a British ship or an engagement where the British were heavily involved (Battle of Jutland, Force Z, etc). Lately for me that has been gathering information on various British warships and making a list of which ones I would like to have as a RC model.
Redpill me on the armor belt of a battleship, does it really help or is it just a meme?
>>33669 The belt armor can do an lot depending on the ranges involved in terms of shellfire or the attack profile of a given missile, or it can be a lot of weight that doesn't directly do much. In short, any munition which strikes the side of a armored ship's hull is going to have to defeat the armor belt in order to cause significant battle-killing damage to the ship. If it bypasses the side of the hull, then it's the deck armor's domain. For classical naval engagements, any shellfire from inside of 17,000 yards had a significant chance of hitting the belt, from there to around 22,000 yards and it was in the 50-50 range, beyond that and it was steadily more likely for it to hit deck armor. Most battleship engagements in history happened within that 22,000 yard range. Furthermore, mines and suicide boats tended to impact the sides of the hulls, as well as surface riding torpedoes; so all of these would have to contend with the belt armor in order to penetrate the hull - of course, for a (partially) underwater explosion weapon like this, there is more to it than just the belt armor, but the belt helps. For modern threats, you still have the mines and suicide boats (the USS Stark was saved by a slightly thicker strake of metal, had it been armored like even a Cleveland or Atlanta it would have taken far less damage overall), but you also have sea-skimming side attack missiles. Very few AShMs have the raw power to blast through 5+ inches of steel and still cause significant damage deep enough into a ship to put it out of commission. As to actually 'defeating' the belt armor conventionally (as in not just bypassing it), that is another can of worms that requires a PHD in both Physics and Metallurgy to accurately explain. But suffice to answer your question, it actually helps, but it's not a 100% sure thing and only works against things that target its area (which is a lot more stuff than people seem to think).
>>33673 Is there a point to up-armoring turret roofs with CNTs to protect against ASBMs or are those better dealt by interceptor missiles and/or evasive maneuvering?
>>33673 I guess it's a big can of worms, but in general, how would the armour scheme of a modern ship with supermaterials look like? I mean, something like the good old distributed armour scheme, but the belt and the top armour should have the same thickness, and the superstructure is just one big box that is similarly protected? Or that would be too ridiculous even with nanoplates (even if we ignore the monetary issues)?
>>33694 If you're going to start introducing CNT-based armor, then likely. Assuming we are talking about a battleship or cruiser armed with a heavy gun-based artillery battery. In those cases, the turret roofs are the easiest vulnerability to hit for precision missiles. Of course, directly answering your question, ALL incoming munitions are better dealt with by hard-killing the munition/source or evading it, it doesn't matter if it's an ASBM, and AShM, or a 7.62mm someone is standing on a boat shooting at you with. This is where the old 'Threat Onion' comes into play. For a Warship in the missile age, it is: Don't be Seen (Evade the Threat), Don't be Targeted (Spoof the Threat), Don't be Hit (Kill the Threat), Don't be Penetrated (Block the Threat), Don't be Killed (Survive the Threat). Armor is in the 4th Layer, which is basically the last layer if you're trying to prevent serious damage. Ideally, you defeat the threat on a layer further out on the onion. Of course, something will get through, even if it's just fragmentation. Armor is to protect against that inevitability being the fatal blow. >>33703 You're right, that's a topic that would require entire libraries to actually convey with 100% accuracy; libraries full of books I am not qualified to write. However, in the most general of terms... If you're talking a ship utilizing supermaterials such as CNT nanoplates, it depends on how much you intend to armor and what you are trying to do with that armor. If you're just trying to protect the vitals of the ship in order to prevent a complete loss, then the armor would be boxes around the vitals - much like the all-or-nothing scheme of yesteryear. If your point is to prevent as much crew death as possible, then the armor would essentially be built into the hull and superstructure of the ship - it would look like what the exterior of the ship looks like, just set in a little with internal boxes around the components that must be exposed to the outside (such as radar). This would also prevent a complete loss of the ship, but the ship could be rendered blind, deaf, and dumb by critical hits on the exposed electronics. Strategic weapon systems and heavy gun-based artillery likely would still work however, so if your ship's purpose is throwing strategic munitions at fixed targets, this would likely prevent a mission kill. If you are trying to prevent mission kills for tactical systems (the goal of the armor in yesteryear), you encounter the reason why Modern Navies gave up on armor (aside from the weight). Modern Navies don't see the point in armor because the difficulty in armoring the abundance of externally mounted sensitive electronics such as the massive radar panels that have become bog standard anymore, most of which could easily be destroyed with as little as a hand grenade or the smallest shard of fragmentation. Armoring the Radar is actually possible as well, but armored electronics have to either be 'peek-a-boo' style or mammothian. In either case, their effective power per unit of volume is going to be drastically lower than the exposed type, making the resulting ship a veritable leviathan if you intend for it to have comparable signals/ECM power to the more vulnerable ships. It's entirely possible, though; especially if you're willing to accept more limited sensors on the ship, it would just be extremely expensive and time consuming to build and operate.
>>33627 >However, there is not a lot of pure battleship vs battleship engagements in WWII to draw examples from. There were a few, but you never hear about them because no Americans were involved: >Lofoten >Calabria >Cape Spartivento >Denmark Strait >North Cape There's evidence of battleships doing hard zigzags in every listed action except North Cape (where both sides kept steaming in a straight line to maximize speed).
>>34043 As long as you aren't trying to insinuate that planned and coordinated zig-zag maneuvers are the extreme evasive maneuvers that the post Strelok posted an image of, I'd agree with you on everything except the Battle of Denmark Straight never being heard of - it's literally the most famous Battleship on Battleship(/-cruiser) engagement in history. In most cases, the zig-zags were planned into the fire cycles, holding a zig or zag long enough for the gun and FC to stabilize and then take a shot before turning again. The time they were shifting from zig to zag or vice versa and re-stabilizing was used to watch the fall of shot; considering the 35 to 50 second times of flight at the expected battle ranges , this pretty much allowed them to fire at reasonable accuracy and fire-rate while still having a modicum of unpredictability since every shot the enemy took basically had to guess whether they would zig in or zag out..
Last week the US christened and launched a new Freedom-class LCS. In unrelated news, the current proposed USN budget calls for 9 of the 16 Freedom-class LCSs to be decommissioned early, on the grounds that they are unable to perform their intended role, since the technology and systems that were supposed to be developed for them were complete failures.
>>33704 Too bad we don't go for white elephant flagships anymore, a modern dreadnought would be interesting to see, however impractical.
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>>34269 Instead of throwing $40 billion into a useless shithole like Ukraine, I would much rather use that money to make a modern 100,000 ton super battleship. I would love to see what such a project would come up with on that budget even if it would be modernizing an older design.
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In the event of societal collapse and a failed state how would the merchant vessels and submarines play into it? They could wield a lot of power and autonomy for being able to run away from conflict and make dealings with port towns and become some sort of pillar of power but not too much so because of the fuel they need to restock, being essentially a moving castle with all that entails or sub-society.
>>34644 Just look at navy in sengoku era japan. Every warlord wants you and there is nothing that can stop you or tie you down from just fucking off
>>34344 Problem with that is that politicians can't steal money from that as easily because they still have to produce a battleship while sending money to their favorite jew comedian let's them skim as much off the top as they want since anything they actually send to Ukraine gets hoovered up by the Russians after they either A. Kill all the conscripts as they do some insane suicide charge or B. The Ukies fucking leave it all behind as they all abandon their posts. So nobody can call the politicians out on skimming millions off the top of the "aid" since it will never be seen by western eyes again anyway.
>>34677 It is still fun to imagine what a modern BB would look like with a massive budget to fund it and the logistics chain to support it. Even if in reality most of the money would be skimmed and what you would get is something like a BB version of the Zumwalt or Ford-class carriers. >>34344 I have been looking at that image and I don't know if the person who made it messed up or the Japs had some future replacement for the Type 96 in the works besides their horrible attempt at copying the 40mm Bofors. Anyone else have an idea on what the AA guns might be? Pic is what I think the possible anti-air guns might be.
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>>34701 I'm rather sure that those are meant to be the Bofors copies put into turrets similar to what the Yamatos had for the 25mm guns in their original configuration. These drawings seem to represent what the Japanese would have wanted to build if the war went quite differently so that they don't have to cancel pretty much everything and also manage to unfuck their AAA situation.
>>34701 >>34702 It's important to warn that Tzoli has a very unique take on the what ifs of warship design in that era and has very, very limited understanding of what is or isn't possible in terms of naval architecture. He quite often insists that three-gun or even four-gun turrets could be positioned in locations that they do not have the structural support to be placed, will add turrets to locations that would have to be machinery space, place secondary/tertiary guns in the blast cones the main battery, and so on. You would think he would have developed a sense for these things when he has been doing this as a hobby for 12+ years, but apparently studying even the slightest bit of Naval Architecture is too much for him, but I digress. So, while nice to look at and a starting point of what-ifs, unless directly lifted from extant plans or scuttlebutt of designs, his what-if designs are generally engineering impossibilities from the Strangereal of Warships. Itself not actually a strong negative, it's just something you have to keep in mind.
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Speaking of Japanese ships and guns, it's a bit strange how lazy they were with the secondaries when it came to modernization, especially with the Kongou-class. They pretty much just added 25mm autocannons and 127mm AA guns, and if they needed additional weight or space the solution was to get rid of a pair of casemate guns. Of course they wanted to completely replace them with brand new units, so using these ships in itself was just meant to be a temporary solution, but it still looks quite bad compared to e.g. Tennessee.
>>34705 It was mainly a money, resource, time, and hull count issue. They had a very limited number of hulls and very limited resources while the US wasn't exactly hurting for anything but fuel tankers. They were putting a majority of their resources into new destroyers, and they couldn't afford to take their most effective surface warfare assets off the front line for the amount of time the refits would take. The US on the other hand had a lot of their battleship force knocked out of the fight early, requiring major repairs, so they basically had no reason not to perform the refit while they already had the ships in the docks for repairs.
>>34706 Not to start an argument, but if I understand correctly, they had properly gut their battlecruisers to upgrade their machine, and they also put in quite a lot of work into the superstructures in the 1930s, and that's why I find it a bit strange. It's like they wanted to keep some of the 140mm guns just to have something for anti-surface work, but they also thought that the original 1910s battery was unnecessary at that point. Really, I'd just like to get into the head of whoever was in charge of these rebuilds.
>>34709 During the period the Kongou-class rebuilds were taking place, nobody was doing the kind secondary battery upgrade you're talking about, though. The American refits you're referring to only happened because the war. Pre-war, the US's refits of their battle line basically came down to the addition of small/medium AA (.50cal/1.1in) and 5in/25cal (or 5in/38cal later on) HAA, while nixing casemate guns if they needed additional weight or topside space. Basically the Japanese and the Americans were doing the same exact thing as each other. Incidentally, the British, French, and Italians were also doing basically the same thing during that time period, with new constructing receiving better. Even though it wasn't by any means the best, it was entirely good enough according to the understanding of the time period, they weren't being lazy about it in that regard. Also, aside from the immediate amidships casemates, the casemate mounts that were removed from the Kongou sisters were all at high risk of washing out during inclement weather, rough seas, or high speeds. Basically every navy was welding over those casemates after the advancement of boiler technology took the battle line speed up to 21kts+ from 17kts.
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>>34701 The mounts next to the turret are rocket launchers. I'm more concerned with that non-Euclidian quarterdeck. >>34705 That's because they were refitted in the early 30s, back when truly effective DP guns didn't really exist. Contemporary US rebuilds made the same compromise.
>>34712 Does anyone have the screencap of the story of the russian baltic fleet? I forgot to save it.
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Is it possible to make a capital ship for the explicit purpose of being nearly literally invulnerable to all current offensive technology?
>>34846 Possible? Easily. Practical? Who's to say. Even without getting into super-technologies such as Nanocomposite Armors, you could very easily do it with modern, proven, and extant technologies. Give it Nuclear Power, fully Integrated Electrical Propulsion, Kevlar/Steel Composite Armor, an excellent Central Fire Control System, and cover the thing in HELs as if they are 40mm Bofors Quad mounts and it's WW2 all over again. HELs can even be used in the blue-green spectrum for hard-kill anti-torpedo defense. Obviously, the sensors are a weakness; so put the major sensors in armored revolving door/pop-up mounts programmed to automatically slam the doors shut (metaphorically speaking) if a threat is on a probable impact trajectory (taking into consideration fragmentation), and use peek-a-boo or (more likely) off axis sensors (which aren't in the line of fire) to guide close-in systems. Your result is an absolutely massive leviathan of a ship, but one that is basically invulnerable to anything short of direct hits with a nuke. It would cost just about as much as you'd expect, though, and likely would get one or more nukes thrown at it in a full blown war; plus I don't even want to imagine the headaches trying to get the port infrastructure required to maintain the thing built and manned.
>>34857 I was thinking something more oriented towards active point defences instead of a floating punching back but unironically thanks for your input.
>>34868 >I was thinking something more oriented towards active point defences That's pretty much exactly what I described, though? High Energy Lasers are pretty much the pinnacle of Active Point Defense weapons with proven, extant technology. The passive defenses such as general armor and the armored sensors are so that any theoretical fragmentation from destroyed close calls don't disable any vital components (such as the sensors or power plant) making the ship a sitting duck.
>>34846 You can't make an invincible ship because nothing afloat can survive nukespam, but you can certainly make one that's unreasonably hard to mission-kill without nukes (or reactivating the Iowas, since true immunity to heavy guns is impractical). A decent secondary battery of 3-5" automatic guns can, with appropriate ammo and fire-control, intercept almost any ASM in service (except maybe Kalibr) with decent reliability. SAMs can also help, but will be exhausted fast and are generally a last resort. Smaller-caliber CIWS acts as the last line of defense. A 12" belt and a 6" deck can stop anything that slips through. For exposed, noncritical systems (secondary armaments, uptakes etc.) you'd need 3-6" all around to protect against the most common threat (slow maneuvering missiles with huge HE payloads). For essential systems like the primary armament and conning tower, 18" armor with ERA may be appropriate in case something like a P-15 somehow gets through. Any missile launchers, aside from the smallest of SAMs, should use arm-type launchers with magazines inside the citadel. The launchers themselves can maybe be shielded. For torpedo defense: noisemakers and towed decoys to avoid the torpedoes, Russian-style ASW rockets to kill the ones that can't be tricked, and very deep torpedo bulkheads to survive anything you can't avoid or kill. Torpedoes to the keel are still a threat, I can't think of any real defense against that. (Maybe something to trick the proximity detonators into firing early?) Diesel-electric propulsion gives you the best subdivision and shock resistance of any arrangement. Space out the props and put half of them on a different circuit from the others to prevent a mobility kill from one lucky hit. This ship won't be very fast, but at least it'll be reasonably fuel-efficient. Surround the radars with CIWS and exercise good EMCON to defeat ARMs. Just in case, the important sensors can be arranged with plenty of redundancy so that any one loss won't leave you with a huge blind spot. As a last resort, the ship should be able to fire all offensive weapons using only local fire-control and the ship's datalink. The superstructure should be built to survive ASM hits and ensuing fires near the base, which is difficult and weight-inefficient but certainly possible. The masts would need to be fairly short as a consequence, or it'll be Fusou levels of top-heavy. No active-radar ASM is smart enough to intentionally aim high up in the superstructure. The resulting vessel is probably a little bigger than a supercarrier, with speed and firepower comparable to a treaty battleship. The only way to stop it is to either employ multiple nuclear weapons, repeatedly attack it with submarines, hit it with hundreds of nearly simultaneous heavy ASMs and hope you get lucky, or reactivate the Iowas. >>34846 >>34869 >laser CIWS >proven, extant technology
>>34872 Yes, Lasers are proven, extant technology. The first successful Solid State Laser shoot down was over 10 years ago, the first deployable system was ready for market in 2008; purportedly, both the Americans and Russians have tested their HELs against targets up to the Hypersonic range, but they are the Americans and Russians, take their claims with salt. In short, the Americans have SSLs, the Germans have SSLs, the Russians have SSLs, the Japanese have SSLs, even the Chinese have cobbled together an SSL system. At this point, the HEL is as proven and extant as the 40mm Bofors was in 1938 and has shot down almost as many test targets worldwide. Also, ERA at sea is a terrible idea, but I agree with the rest of your points if you were designing a more practical Battleship equivalent.
>>34872 >or reactivating the Iowas, since true immunity to heavy guns is impractical Considering that the best defence is offence, could you just try to outgun the Iowas?
>>34857 >sensors Why not omit long-range sensors/radar from the capital (Battle)ship and have an escort feed it targeting data instead?
>>34872 >nothing afloat can survive nukespam Why not? A combination of mobility, early warning sensors, air defences and ABMs could prevent everything except USA or Russia nuke spamming the wider area you sail in.
>>34880 I think having the farthest and most accurate sensors (and spotters) is more important than having the biggest guns in most cases.
>>34891 Two reasons, one obvious the other less obvious. First: Because then the capital ship is only as strong as the escorts, once the escorts are dealt with the capital ship is vulnerable to boarding and seizure. Second: 988ms Ping.
>>34922 >988ms ping Even with line of sight laser comms? >once the escorts are dealt with the capital ship is vulnerable to boarding and seizure. All escorts being dead implies that WW3 has kicked off the capital ship itself has already been mission killed in some way, and for the ship to be vulnerable to boarding and seizure any would-be Somalians would have to get past its remaining armaments, crew and scuttling charges of which there should still be a reasonable number left unless the ship was disabled by nuke shells.
How effective are Aegis networks against aircraft without predictable courses? Are ships' anti-air somehow more effective against maneuverable targets than the questionably effective land-based batteries like Patriots and S-300s?
>>34941 >Even with line of sight laser comms? Laser Data Transmission is unreliable when both transmitter and receiver are both pitching and rolling at rates unpredictable in relation to each other. Unpredictable is not something you want in your self-defense grid when missing even a single packet can have devastating consequences. Also, the point of the ship in question is to be as near invulnerable as possible; there is no point in such a ship if sinking the comparatively extremely vulnerable escorts not only mission kills the ship, but causes the loss of tens of billions of dollars of (at this point) basically unscathed capital ship; the ship must be self-reliant enough that at the minimum it can stand and fight until replacement escorts arrive, but the ideal is that its escorts are smaller, highly defensible (if not almost as invulnerable) ships - which makes this sensor issue a moot point anyway, since you still have to protect sensors somewhere. >>35004 >How effective are Aegis networks against aircraft without predictable courses? This is a hard one to answer, because to a certain degree AEGIS and other similar systems exist specifically to make unpredictable threat trajectories (/courses) predictable. Even wildly maneuvering missiles (the most unpredictable of all aircraft) are to a certain degree predictable, because you can reach a conclusion on where the missile will be based on where it is, where it was, when it was there, and where it wants to go. In short, the missile-knows-where-it-is.mp4 but for AA targeting. While AEGIS is getting a bit long in the tooth, from my understanding it continues to do its job well as long as the entire system is well maintained, which is unfortunately becoming rarer and rarer. >Are ships' anti-air somehow more effective against maneuverable targets than the questionably effective land-based batteries Mainly due to the sheer number of advantages that sea-based platforms have, such as raw available bulk, sensor size, known friendly locations, the ability to just assume the threat already knows about said friendlies, and the generally wide open spaces that are the open ocean (even around landmasses, the water is generally far more open than where land-based systems have to act unless they are in a desert). Even the shortest detection time (short range, hyper-sonic sea skimming missiles) IIRC gives the ship between 9 and 12 seconds to react to the threat. 9 seconds is an eternity for a land based system, which usually has around 4 to 6 seconds. Land Based fixed installations (such as AEGIS Ashore) tend to have roughly the same capability as sea based platforms, however. Advantage of being a prepared defensive location that any given enemy is well aware about, no need for concealment and you can have those massive radar arrays blaring wildly. A Patriot/THAAD or S-300 battery would get SEAD'd in a heartbeat if they were to try the same. Obviously, all of that is just as to my limited understanding. Not a land guy.
The question of SEAD makes me wonder how effective spark gap transmitters are as a poor man's barrage jammer against modern day anti-radiation missiles.
>>35030 >>34891 >>34922 Do carrier fleet escorts provide any significant advantage over having all their sensors and firepower on a single ship other than not being a single target? I mean sensors' range, power and resolution, weapons load and crews' coordination would be more volume, energy and cost effective on a single ship of the same tonnage as the entire carrier fleet since it could have more room for weapons, a single massive power source like a nuclear reactor, larger sensors and an onboard supercomputer.
>>35055 Carriers require a lot of space to operate, and even Battleships prefer to have said space and forewarning. As the Sensors of Escorts are centered on the Escort themselves, and Escorts are usually positioned many miles away from the ship they are escorting, having escorts extends both the maximum and minimum range for Radar (since the radar horizon is different in different locations) and creates a much wider sonar net. Note, the Capital Ship being escorted is the last line of defense; the rest of the fleet is either support for that Capital Ship or are sacrificial pawns meant to take the blows for said Capital Ship; every escort ship adds to the layers of defense because they either expand or solidify the network of defense around the capital ship. As for Carriers specifically, Carriers are extremely hard to actually armor properly. Their flight decks actually can be well armored - most Supercarriers' decks actually are armored - but they can't armor most of the vital components that have to be exposed for them to do their jobs. Namely the arrestor wire systems, the catapults, and most importantly the aircraft themselves. Covered flight decks have been tried, they ''technically' can perform the absolute minimums required to call a ship a carrier, but saying they're bad for carrier operations is an understatement. So the Carrier's best line of protection is simply don't get hit in the first place. This can either be achieved with a massive network of escorts and a modestly defended Carrier (US Navy current concept) or a medium escort and a heavily armed Carrier (Late-WW2 US style shown best for the time by the original configuration Midway-class or in the cold-war by the Russian/Soviet concept seen in the earlier image). Either way, the escorts are vital to allow the Carrier enough time to react to the threat - the same would be true for a hypothetical well armed and armored Battleship, the Escorts are primarily there to extend and reinforce the engagement/sensor range verses hostiles, not to supplant the Capital Ship's own engagement/sensor profiles.
>>35066 Intuitively I know you are right but in peer vs peer scenario would not sending a PT boat with a rudimentary radar to expand the horizon be more cost effective than practically sacrificing a Ticonderoga just to expand SAM's range by a few tens of kilometers?
>>35117 A PT Boat would have such a low radar array/disk that there wouldn't really be any point in deploying the boat where the Capital ship could still 'see' it. The Capital Ship would likely have superior radar range than the PT Boat at that distance, and the ships being able to 'see' each other is important, especially when communications go down and each ship is trying to guess what is happening with their immediate neighbors (which informs them what they need to be doing if they don't have any significant emotional events occurring onboard their own ship). You need at minimum a heavy frigate to function as an Capital Escort. Also, due to the prevalence of Sea Skimming missiles, adding just ~20km to the effective detection/engagement range of the anti-missile grid is a 100% increase in the amount of time the Capital Ship has to react to said missile.
Is it possible to misdirect a radar-guided AShM into hitting a specific, extra well armored part of a ship's hull or at least make the missile fly in a vector that's slightly easier to hit by interceptors and CIWS?
>>35150 It is very possible, most ECM today is rigged to misdirect incoming missiles to give a predictable flight path if it cannot spoof it into missing the ship entirely. Doesn't always work, obviously, and some missiles are either too dumb or too smart to trick; but that's one of the reasons why AShMs aren't often ARMs - way too predictable of flight paths.
How powerful are the second and third tier navies of the world? I'm mostly thinking of the euro ones, although I'm not even sure which European navies amount to anything nowadays.
>>35358 Last I checked the French still maintained quite a navy and the Australians manage one of the most specialized if not small navies in the world. I think for the most part any country outside of Africa with access to warm water ports likely has a decent enough naval presence to making fighting them painful, even if doable. India's Navy is considered rather "small" compared to its neighbors, but they maintain almost 20 submarines and an aircraft carrier. Indonesia, one of the largest Muslim majority countries in the world (also not the richest outside the Christian cities), maintains 2 submarines, a few corvettes/frigates, and a repurposed Japanese pseudo-aircraft carrier in its bluewater fleet, however its coastguard, greenwater fleet and hybrid blue-green fleet (what matters for the territory) maintains a fairly expansive set of vessels whether it's mining boats, amphibious assault boats, missile boats, etc.
Point being, While conquerable it would not be palatable to the large navies to do so due to their own losses. Polite sage.
Is any anon ITT autistic enough to spoonfeed me a family tree of all modern warships above the size of corvette?
>>35632 My knowledge of ships starts and ends at "it floats and has big guns on it, that one carries planes." Sorry, anon.
>>35786 I'd wiki it myself but I am a tad too full on Academic obligations ATM and already amassed way more procrastinations than I can afford.
>>35632 My understanding is fairly limited, but from that understanding, you have several lineages for each ship type. Torpedo boats, being fast, small ships designed for attacking bigger ships, begat destroyers and fast attack craft. Cruisers, which were initially distinguished between being unprotected, protected (having an armored deck), and armored (having a belt of armor on their sides), evolved into light, heavy, and battle cruisers, respectively. Battleships evolved from the ironclad, which then evolved into the dreadnoughts. They were later limited by the Washington Treaty in both quantity made and displacement, forcing many nations to build smaller ships. Then there are the super-heavy battleships like the IJN Yamato and the USN Iowa. Carriers were initially converted into battleships or battlecruisers. Their roles diversified into escort carriers, light carriers, fleet, and supercarriers. There's probably some more to it, but like I said, I'm don't know all of it.
Could hypersonic missiles be the end of carriers? As it stands, while China still can't get 20km accuracy in a desert, Russia seems to be using them fairly efficiently when they've tested them out in Ukraine. Unanchored smaller ships are probably too small to use them accurately at the moment since the ship is jostled around too much by the waves (relative to a stationary target), but an aircraft carrier can be about 1-3 skyscrapers in length which seems plenty big enough if you can calculate its trajectory. >>35835 I don't know much but that seems fairly accurate for the bluewater vessels. >>35632 I wouldn't bother with greenwater vessels and hybrid bluewater/greenwater vessels since once you get into the smaller ship sizes
Is brass still the best material for propellers, or are there are weird and crazy proposals floating around for some alternative material?
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>>35841 >Could hypersonic missiles be the end of carriers? As it stands, while China still can't get 20km accuracy in a desert, Russia seems to be using them fairly efficiently when they've tested them out in Ukraine. Unanchored smaller ships are probably too small to use them accurately at the moment since the ship is jostled around too much by the waves (relative to a stationary target), but an aircraft carrier can be about 1-3 skyscrapers in length which seems plenty big enough if you can calculate its trajectory. From what I understand, the real limiting factor is the killchain when going after something like a CBG. Even with hypersanec, your firing solution at launch is going to be out of date by the time the weapon gets wherever it's going, so you have to update it in real time, which not everybody can do (though if anyone else can, it'd be the Russians or the bugs). There's also that nagging little issue of killing a CBG being a pretty surefire way to kick off Round Three, which no one is really in a position to seriously consider at the moment. The only two powers with the strategic ass to do it have no reason to; the bugs can just sit back and watch the Jews destroy us from the inside while they (the bugs) play the long game, and the Russians are content merely to defend (and, as opportunity presents itself, expand) their regional hegemony. tl;dr it's theoretically possible, but I'm not seeing the carrier's swan song any time soon. Especially when there's really no substitute when it comes to force projection and gunboat diplomacy. >>37908 I see some vague mention of composite materials on Wikipedia, but nothing concrete. "If it ain't broke", I guess.
I know the question gets thrown around plenty about a US-Chinese engagement in the South China Sea, but does China actually have any proper deterrents to stop submarine strikes? That seems to be a glaring weakness that they are trying and failing to fix right now. >>37926 >tl;dr it's theoretically possible, but I'm not seeing the carrier's swan song any time soon. Especially when there's really no substitute when it comes to force projection and gunboat diplomacy. Sounds like the F35 may serve an actual niche in being launchable from smaller ships then, but that the technology probably still has a couple decades before it becomes a real threat to ships.
Royal Navy HMS Prince of Wales breaks down off south coast https://archive.ph/F8g2D >The Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales is limping back to shore after breaking down shortly after embarking for exercises in the US. The carrier left from Portsmouth Naval Base on Saturday before an "emerging mechanical issue" occurred. On Monday, the warship was moving slowly from the south east of the Isle of Wight towards Stokes Bay, Gosport. It is understood the sheltered area will make it easier for divers to examine the damage. The Royal Navy previously confirmed the 65,000-tonne vessel was in the South Coast Exercise Area. The warship's departure was planned for Friday, but had been delayed because of a technical issue. The Royal Navy was not able to offer any further details or confirm if the earlier technical issue was related to the mechanical problem. >Specialist website Navy Lookout has reported that the issue was caused by damage to the starboard propeller shaft, although the MoD has not confirmed or commented on this. The website says a photograph of the carrier leaving Portsmouth shows only a wake on the port side suggesting a problem with the other propeller shaft. It states that, unless the problem can be resolved at sea enabling the warship to continue its journey to the US, it might need to go into dry dock at Rosyth in Scotland early, ahead of a planned inspection in 2023. >The Nato flagship was sailing to undertake training exercises with the US Navy as well as the Royal Canadian Navy and United States Marine Corps. The warship, built at Rosyth at a cost of £3bn, had a colourful send-off on Saturday as it passed thousands of revellers at the Victorious Festival on Southsea Common. Old news by now, but it's a bit sad to see how low they have fallen. At this rate Argentina might as well restart this whole Falklands business.
>>37926 Why were eastern bloc anti-ship missiles , like the Kitchen, always high supersonic (mach 3+) while NATO ones like Harpoon and Exocet subsonic? What was so different in their doctrine?
>>40253 >it Fucking AP mafia trying to kill millennia old traditions.
>>40253 >broken propeller shaft At this point, I'm under the impression that the name Prince of Wales is just cursed. >>40348 Stealth and accuracy, more or less. High speed missiles are easier to detect and and harder to make sea skimming (that didn't stop the Russians from doing it, however); somewhat ironically, those slower missiles (earlier on) were also harder to hit for CIWS due to generally having more fuel during the terminal phase, being more able to afford terminal maneuvering, but this 'advantage' was minimal (and the US for one never took advantage of it). The math on making those missiles accurate is also a lot easier for slower missiles.
>>40348 NATO doctrine calls for everybody using a single ASM across all launch platforms, so everything has to be light enough to fit on a Harrier. For that weight, you can have any two of speed, range and payload. The Soviets didn't make this compromise, so the bombers carry a missile that's four times the weight of a Harpoon while the destroyers carry a missile that weighs as much as a Harrier.
>>40467 Sounds a bit paradoxical the reverse wasn't the case. The alliance of history's richest militaries opting for the low tech logistically sound solution while the history's poorest superpower spending trillions of rubbles to fancy wunderwaffen.
>>40641 It makes more sense if you mostly take out money from the equation: there is a force with lots units to be equipped, so they opt for a good enough solution; and the enemy has a limited number of units, so they might as well try to make up for quantity with quality (or just raw firepower), because they will still spend significantly less money even if they spurge a bit. It's roughly similar to small armies buying high quality guns for their soldiers.
I wonder how well the German pre-Dreadnoughts would have fared in ww2 if they decided to keep as many of them as possible, and converted them into monitors. I imagine something along these lines: >give them some really big bulged that make them virtually invulnerable against torpedoes >keep them 2x2 28cm main guns and the 14 pieces of 17cm guns that make up the secondary battery >get rid of the torpedo launchers and the old 8.8cm guns, and instead put as many dual-purpose 8.8cm (or 10.5cm) guns and AA autocannons on them as you can fit >replace the engines with turbines or diesel, just so that they can still have a reasonable speed for this line of work >also slap on extra armour if you can After the end of ww1 they still had all 5 Braunschweig-class ships and 5 Deutschland-class pre-Dreadnoughts, although 3 of the former and 1 of the latter were scrapped by 1933. Still, 4 of them converted into 1940s floating batteries could have been useful at the siege of Leningrad considering how much trouble the coastal artillery gave to the Heer.
>>43396 >After the end of ww1 they still had all 5 Braunschweig-class ships and 5 Deutschland-class pre-Dreadnoughts, Fucked that up, they only had 4 Deutschlands, because one of them was lost at Jutland. Still, the math checks out, they had a total of 4 ships between the two classes when the Nazis came into power.
>>43396 For the few engagements they would have been useful, I can't imagine them doing poorly; but I can't imagine them actually changing the outcome of anything either.
>>43405 To be fair, to change the outcome anything related to ww2 would require some fundamental changes to German strategy to the point that any tactical considerations are meaningless. These pre-Dreadnoughts just seem to be one of the many potentials they carelessly wasted, because they clearly had no idea what to do with them, and in the end they were just used as floating AA batteries.
I have a question regarding the Queen Elizabeth class carriers. Are there any benefits to having a carrier with two islands compared to a one island carrier? To me, having a second island would not be worth losing deck space that could be used by aircraft, even though you could use the second island as a backup in case of battle damage. Also, are the downsides of a ski jump deck (aircraft can't load as much fuel and munitions as normal, which impacts mission scope) worth it when looking at it from a budget perspective (you can design and operate a smaller carrier, which can have lower operating costs)? I see that a lot of smaller navies use ski jumps on their carriers while the USN dose not, which I assume is because the USN can afford to build massive super-carriers and is not worried too much with the size and cost of the carriers.
>>43721 >Islands Forward Islands are better for navigation. Aftward Islands are better for flight operations. The QE class was basically the UK trying to have their cake and eat it too. It was not a very practical decision. >STOBAR/STOVL vs CATOBAR People often claim that CATOBARs have to be large or expensive, but the Charles de Gaulle is smaller than every major STOBAR (Kuznetsov/Liaoning/Queen Elizabeth) except the Vikrant and quite possibly cheaper than most of them as well. Personally, given the ski-jumps actually cause considerably more damage to the aircraft than catapults do to properly designed (for catapults) aircraft, I don't consider Ski-Jump Carriers to be worth it if you're actually trying to be serious about the whole naval aviation thing. Economically, there comes a point that you start having to replace/repair aircraft at a rate that you effectively bought a new carrier if you actually commit to the flight hours required to keep a competent naval air force. Sure, CATOBARs generally require 'heavier' built aircraft to resist the stresses, but that generally results in sturdier, longer-lasting aircraft anyway. Even the heavy-built aircraft don't like ski-jumps, you stress parts of the frame that are not meant to be stressed.
>>43724 >Aftward Islands are better for flight operations while Forwards Islands are better for navigation. I did not know that and that would explain the changes in placement of the islands on USN carriers over time from the Midway-class to the Ford-class carriers. >The QE class was basically the UK trying to have their cake and eat it too. It was not a very practical decision. I guess they decided to try out the two island setup, see how it performs, and decided if it is worth incorporating into the class that will replace the QEs. Though I am surprised that they didn't try to design something like a modernized Forrestal-class carrier. That would seem to be something that would not be too expensive for a country like Britain to build and maintain. >Stress on aircraft frames I guess the Royal Navy is counting on keeping the flight hours on the carrier aircraft low enough that they don't accumulate enough stress damage to warrant early replacement. I guess they might change their tune if a major naval conflict breaks out, but for the time being I don't see that happening.
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>>43721 Would the flat deck super carrier proposals from the late 1940s be viable with modern tech if one were to put the bridge below deck and fit all the radar, radio equipment etc. on a pole/islet that takes up less space than a regular island?
>>43734 Not really. If you were wanting good stability for the delicate equipment (very important considering the weight), you would still end up with a mast with a footprint the size of the Ford-class Island, so you may as well just build the Island if you can't use that deck space anyway. Somewhat surprisingly, the Ford-class Island is already tiny, relatively speaking. Compare it to the Nimitz, in pics related. Very little deck space is actually used in either, you wouldn't be saving much space at all by converting it to a pure mast and you would be losing the old Mark 1 Eyeball when things go wrong... and they go wrong quite often, even on USN Carriers.
Today I learned that beached whales are largely a result of submarine sonars being so fucking loud that the whale flees towards anywhere where the sound isn't as bad (since a sonar can be loud enough to rupture human organs a hundred miles away). Apparently this is an open secret.
>>43897 People seem to think noise pollution doesn't matter but underwater it's terrible. Even aside from sonar, ordinary shipping noise causes a lot of harm. Back early on in covid lockdowns, when the cruise industry collapsed and international shipping was way down too, cetologists suddenly started seeing behaviours they hadn't seen before, because whales could actually communicate without being drowned out by propellers. I remember seeing one report about humpbacks, where the generally accepted view was that mother whales were mostly prevented from effectively hunting by having to babysit the calf. But once the shipping vanished, they discovered that the natural behaviour was actually that the mother would leave the calf in a sheltered spot while joining group hunts with other whales, knowing that if anything happened she'd still be able to communicate with the calf. It was only when the ocean was too loud for that communication that they were forced to stick together, making motherhood an enormously more demanding process.
>>43897 It's not really a secret, even thought it effectually is one, they concluded that much would happen back when they originally made Active Sonar as a concept. They just quite simply didn't care because human needs were considered more important than the needs of aquatic life. Whether you agree with them or not, at least they were honest about it. Today, people just tend to either ignore the inconvenient truths or exaggerate them. The whales are actually one sad element of Sonar use, whales are good for the ocean, but ffs the eco-terrorists that forced the US to be unable to use Sonar in ASW training were going on about Dolphins. Fuck dolphins, the rapist bastards.
>>43901 Is there a modern alternative to active sonar? I recall the one where some extremely high quality pictures were used to determine where a sub was based on the changes it made on the surface of the water, but I imagine that's not a 100% solution. Maybe LIDARs? And could the US Navy nag congress for cash to develop these technologies if they claimed they just want to save the whales?
>>43917 >Is there a modern alternative to active sonar? LIDAR is the most promising, and it's technically already good enough. It's just extremely expensive if you want it to be more accurate than rough estimation. It also doubles as potential future Anti-Torpedo Defense. >I recall the one where some extremely high quality pictures were used to determine where a sub was based on the changes it made on the surface of the water, but I imagine that's not a 100% solution. Correct. The problem with that method is it relies on High Altitude Aircraft or Satellites, neither of which will be operational for long in any war where hunting submarines is an issue. Of course, if you have some method of actively defending your satellites, suddenly that is a very viable option. >could the US Navy nag congress for cash to develop these technologies if they claimed they just want to save the whales? Sadly, no. They have been trying that very line for decades and haven't gotten much more than chump change. At the end of the day for all their whining about climate change and being eco-friendly, none of the big shots actually give a damn about the environment.
>>43918 >It also doubles as potential future Anti-Torpedo Defense. As in cranking up the LIDAR until it becomes an energy weapon? Could the same work on the surface, even if only to track incoming missiles?
>>43899 I think the main issue is that sound travels 60x faster (further?) underwater than it does in air. Unfortunately I can't think of a way to fix that other than passive systems, and I'm not about to sacrifice the human experience for another creature even if I feel bad for them. >>43901 >It's not really a secret, even thought it effectually is one >Today, people just tend to either ignore the inconvenient truths or exaggerate them. Yes, an open secret. >whales are good for the ocean, but ffs the eco-terrorists that forced the US to be unable to use Sonar in ASW training were going on about Dolphins. Fuck dolphins, the rapist bastards. Dolphins don't rape people (though they do rape other dolphins). That's a meme from a handful of news sites that got duped by a parody site and rolled with the story. That aside, my main concern with whales is that they really a keystone species. Not in the "phytoplankton are a carbon sink hurr durr" way but in the "whales either eat phytoplankton, krill, or small fish to prevent population blooms and then shit out the nutrients to the sea floor to sustain a large percentage of deep ocean life including the majority of deep ocean coral reefs" kind of way. The four main animals in the ocean food chain are whales, krill, phytoplankton, and those stupid small fish outnumbering humanity 10:1 that swim back and forth between mid-ocean and upper-ocean areas that I can't remember the name of are a very fragile and unfortunately very global ecosystem that sustain the majority of sea life, and the effects are pretty obvious in the fishing industry if nothing else. >>43917 >Is there a modern alternative to active sonar? Passive sonar, but you can only do so much with it. If they could change it from a high-frequency noise to a low-frequency noise then the power output wouldn't matter nearly as much (the frequency is more important than the strength in determining the number of decibels a sonar produces), but it would be an overall weaker system that couldn't travel as far. Low-frequency sonar is great for mapping out the sea floor but it doesn't work so good for finding things. >LIDAR I imagine you'd run into refraction issues in the water, but you could probably use LIDAR. You still run into an issue with LIDAR where you're sending out a high-energy high-frequency laser (or set of lasers) so you have to strike a balance between "strong enough to see in the distance" and "weak enough to not boil water." The primary reason SONARs never got more powerful was because if you gave them any more juice than some of the old soviet submarines, then suddenly the water begins to boil around the sonar revealing your location and effectively blocking your vision. In general LIDAR is better for air and SONAR is better for water.
>>43919 That's effectively what the next-gen missile defense systems in production currently do. They just attach it to a missile for active interception.
>>43919 >As in cranking up the LIDAR until it becomes an energy weapon? Effectively, yes. It mainly only 'works' (in theory) because the very same frequency range of laser required for long-distance underwater scanning also just happens to be the only laser frequency range that works well enough underwater to get any appreciable effect on target. Yes, you boil the water when you 'shoot' the torpedo and give away your location, but if the enemy is firing torpedoes at you they already know where you are. >Could the same work on the surface, even if only to track incoming missiles? I mean, that's how LIDAR already works? The issue is getting a powerful enough laser in a compact, robust, and durable enough package to be used as a directed energy weapons system. But every major military power now has a variant of solid-state laser that qualifies for this.
Don't know if you faggots care, but the newest ship in the Canadian fleet is is scheduled to return to dryfock to repair critical propulsion faults. Her sister ships are reporting serious flaws in their power generation plants as well as thousands of other deficiencies across the board. Is Irving, the primary contractor for this project to blame? The policy makers and project planners for managing the entire program poorly? Or is the military at fault for not operating their new kit safely and effectively? And more importantly, how will this affect Canada's claims to the Arctic when the purpose-built ships she's invested so much money into have so many problems?
Would the Germans have been better off in ww2 if they built no destroyers, and used those resources to build more light cruisers, or this is just a plain retarded idea? Compared to the Pacific, it's as if destroyers didn't even exists in the Atlantic, except as convoy escorts for ASW.

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