>>16117 The Tomahawk is in fact the USN's primary land strike missile.

>>16066 Is it also deeper? It sounds like they had an idea for a new missile, and so went ahead and developed the VLS cells for it even before the missile itself was developed.

>>16124 >Is it also deeper? The Mk57 units are available in the same lengths as the Mk41. >It sounds like they had an idea for a new missile, and so went ahead and developed the VLS cells for it even before the missile itself was developed. You are correct, they did. There were low-end IRBMs and even VLS UAVs proposed for the Mk57, but all of them lost funding very early on.

>>16134 So the Zumwalt was neutered of both its guns AND its missiles?

>>16144 Yes. They also cut the funding to the systems which would have let the Mk57s integrate with the already existing supply of missiles. As it is, the only missiles in inventory it can use are, IIRC, the Tomahawks and I believe one of the Standard variants. In other words, nearly completely useless, it can't even defend itself.

>>16147 And let us not forget how the 57mm secondaries were also downgraded to 30mm autocannons. I'm starting to feel sorry for this ship, she's like Frankenstein's monster, except that she can't even go to the North Pole to die. Are the claims about the hull design exaggerated or is it actually even worse than what most sources claim?

>>16149 >I'm starting to feel sorry for this ship, she's like Frankenstein's monster, except that she can't even go to the North Pole to die. Pretty apt way to put it. >Are the claims about the hull design exaggerated or is it actually even worse than what most sources claim? The hull design, in terms of stealth, was ironically one of the only parts of the entire ship concept that worked as intended as originally built. Sure it had some problems with leaks and bad welds which had more to do with failure of the shipyard (which was to be expected, they were employing entirely new techniques without being allowed the usual dummy build to get into it), but the design itself was sound. The major problems of its instability, especially in high sea states, and desire to become a submarine were well known even before it was laid down. The loss of stealth from waves revealing too much of the hull is an overblown claim. However, all of that is void since congress demanded that a bunch of extra equipment was added onto the ship (while cutting the budget for the equipment), so the Navy gave up and added cupolas and extensions to the super structure to mount conventional electronics/communication equipment, completely ruining the stealth of the ship.

https://archive.is/6eIhK >Iran converts decommissioned oil tanker into a warship >Venezuela, an oil-rich country, has a fuel shortage >Iran sends warship full of oil to Venezuela as "humanitarian aid" to get around American sanctions I don't know why but the irony of this whole scenario is fucking hilarious.

>>13038 And since then the second part about the Montana-class is online, with a similar amount of work dedicated to the various proposals. https://warshipprojects.com/2018/09/25/montana-class-genesis-reloaded/ https://warshipprojects.com/2019/04/04/montana-class-genesis-reloaded-2/

Bismarck vs Hood original WWII recordings footage https://yewtu.be/watch?v=oWvZ8EEoovM >Original footage of battle at denmark strait. Video had no sounds. so i added the sounds.

Why were German 38cm gun turrets so gigantic? I've read three theories, and I don't have the means to check which one of them is true. >bad hoist design The two hoists were so gigantic that they needed a turret with enough room for 3 guns. But they weren't fast enough to supply 3 guns with enough shells for combat, and so it would have only lowered the overall RoF, and that's not what they wanted. It sounds plausible, but it's still a bit baffling that they could make decently sized triple turrets for their 28cm guns and yet all their know-how was not enough for a triple 38cm. >breech design The guns had sliding breech blocks, and that either made the gun themselves larger; meant they need more space inside the turret to operate; or the brass cases had something to do with the oversized hoists. I don't see how these would need such an enlarged turret. >superior Teutonic salvoes There are various arguments about how Germans preferred salvoes that required an even number of guns. This one sounds like an excuse if anything.

>>16708 >Why were German 38cm gun turrets so gigantic? IIRC, it was a combination of the first two, actually. The hoists were very robust, but were very large to make up for it, which multiplies the next element's problems. While the guns themselves were huge due to the semi-semi-fixed propellant (I forget the correct term for the Bismarck's set up), this was more or less made up for by the heavy breech allowing the guns to be situated farther forward, stuck out of the turret. The brass end charge, however, being in addition to the bagged charges required an additional (section of) hoist on top of the standard powder hoist, making the hoist itself absurdly huge and required a nearly excessive amount of working space to manhandle.

How's the Black Sea when it comes to building capital ships? Is the coastline suitable for it everywhere, or only certain parts are good enough for that?

>>16772 No clue, but apparently the Russians have created a "political lake" where Ukrainian ships are trapped because they can't get them out, which suggests the latter.

I was watching a video about how digging deeper/larger channels (or expanding rivers in a similar manner) causes less hydraulic drag (friction) leading to an increase in wave size that ultimately causes nuisance flooding in surrounding regions. A lot of estimates are apparently suggesting that a combination of rising sea levels and less hydraulic drag due to human intervention will ultimately mean that high tide will be synonymous with flooding in the future. How does anon feel this will influence green water navies and coast guards? I imagine if high tide and nuisance flooding become synonymous, smuggling groups will likely take advantage of moon schedules to smuggle more efficiently. Do you think the number of cases of beached ships will go up with these problems over the next couple decades? Will governments eventually tell larger tankers to fuck off and force an upper limit on ship size, or will it be a tragedy of the commons with governments ever-expanding their waterways in the hopes of not losing potential business along their rivers and channels?

>>16774 >>16772 Considering the fact that the majority of Soviet capital ship construction post WW2 was in Ukraine (Mykolaiv, Odessa, Kherson) that should be enough to tell you.

>>16853 But what if Erdogan's next-in-line wants to be the Turkish Wilhelm II and decides to build a gigantic fleet? From a geopolitical perspective it makes more sense to build them in the Black Sea than in the Aegean or the Mediterranean, because then they ˝just˝ have to worry about Russia instead of anyone with access to the Mediterranean.

Would a vaguely Yamato-inspired flight facility that also service boats and other launches work in a modern battleship? Put a helipad one deck below in the aft, use the space in front of it as a hangar (you couldn't use for too many thing the deck above it due to the blast of the main guns); and also have some cranes in the edges, so that you can put boats and hydroplanes into the same hangar.

>>16920 The Yamato is the most aesthetically pleasing battleship that ever existed, gotta say.

>>16920 I could see such a facility used more for operating different drone vehicles than hydroplanes and service boats on a modern ship. IIRC both USS Iowa and USS Wisconsin deployed drones during various operations in the 1980s.

>>16949 Yes, that would be its main use in combat, but I imagine you might have to bring people aboard in peacetime without the ship docking somewhere just for the sake of less than a dozen sailors. I just don't know if putting all the aircraft and boats in a hangar like this is a workable idea. The ultramodern method seems to be having gigantic doors on the sides of the ship, and I can't imagine that it works well if you want to armour the hull.

>>16954 >I can't imagine that it works well if you want to armour the hull The Yamato did have these recessed hanger doors built into the side, so I guess that the Japs figured they could armor the sides enough to provide sufficient protection. For me it seems like having your hangers on the side is better than having an elevator on deck where you would have to have a hole in the deck armor for the elevator, especially when you have drones that don't need catapults to be launched. Plus when you look at where most of the bomb and torpedo hits were made on Yamato, there were mostly in the middle of the ship, not on the stern where you would have your hanger space. The main way I could see drones being used on a battleship would be many multiple drones deployed as a drone swarm either as some form of defense (anti-air and anti-missile work) and for reconnaissance work. Most of the time in modern navies battleships are escorting aircraft carriers, so I do not see the need for a massive hanger built into the battleship when you have an aircraft carrier that can provide better air support than what drones can currently do.

>>16956 >having your hangers on the side is better than having an elevator on deck where you would have to have a hole in the deck armor for the elevator Maybe I just can't describe it properly, but what I have in that the helipad is placed where the aft gun of pic related is, and the doors of the hangar are in front of the helicopter once it lands, so there is no need for a lift. And then a main turret could be placed where the helipad is. Of course a Ticonderoga is way too small for it to work. >The Yamato did have these recessed hanger doors built into the side That actually lead me to a wild chase for more info on the Yamato, and found out that there is a VR ˝game˝ that is a virtual tour of the ship, but it actually showcases a lot of minor details. Unfortunately there isn't a ˝playthrough˝ without any commentary, and the best thing I could find was this German going through all of the ship: https://yewtu.be/watch?v=8SwWM720oJM And that reminds me of one more thing: why did wooden decks disappear from warships? Is it something to do with functionality or just cost reduction?

>>17062 >Helipad It's doable, but not really ideal and adds some stresses to the hull frame. Nothing that couldn't be overcame, though. Would making landing ops a bit hazardous, but it'd be a lot less hazardous than landing on an OHP, and that was done for 30 years. Would end up aesthetically ugly as sin, though. >why did wooden decks disappear from warships? Slip resistant paint became a thing. The wooden decks on steel ships were to assist the sailors and marines in not slipping around on deck. Once slip resistant paint became a thing, they switched over to steel decks, much to the sailors' chagrin.

>>17104 So the best way for a battleship is to put Yamato-style side hangars for drones and boats, and also have a helipad on the deck, but park the helicopters on other ships that need them anyway (e.g. ASW ships)? >Once slip resistant paint became a thing, they switched over to steel decks, much to the sailors' chagrin. I take walking on a wooden deck is better than walking on steel, especially in tropical climates. And they look nicer. But is there more to the story?

>>17104 >Paint Reminds me of how American ships removed most doors because the doors were spreading Syphilis back in the 1800s.

>>17114 In the end, there is no best way to do it. Even the Yamato-style hangars were actually compromise designs by the Japanese due to the blast effect of their 18in guns destroying the boats. This slowed down boat operations and put a very severe limit on the number of motor whale boats the ships could carry. As for flight ops, if any given non-ASW/CV ship were to carry dedicated aircraft or not is a topic of much debate among theorists, especially flag ships such as Battleships or Cruisers. With drones/helicopters (they are roughly the same size anymore), the Americans have preferred on-deck hangars, having tried old floatplane-style in-deck hangars and deciding they were too wet. The Russians continued to use them with the Kirovs, but scuttlebutt is that they don't like them for the same reason. The Yamato-style side-doors are likely to still be wet, which would have the Americans (and probably the Russians) dislike them. In the end, as I said, there is no best way and you could easily argue a design in any direction. Everything is compromises and concept of operations. >But is there more to the story? No, you basically have it.

>>17118 So we"d need another naval arms race to see what works, preferably with at least one small conflict that involves actual combat. Could cruisers be used to ˝prototype˝ battleships, like how the Japanese did it in the 1930s? Although if we are speaking about ships armed with major calibre rifles that can fire scramjets, but without the impenetrable nanoplate armour, then they'd be more like battlecruisers.

>>17131 >So we"d need another naval arms race to see what works, preferably with at least one small conflict that involves actual combat. Essentially, yes. Or one very interested power that devoted itself to pushing the boundaries; extremely unlikely, but it has happened before in history. >Could cruisers be used to ˝prototype˝ battleships Yes, easily. >Although if we are speaking about ships armed with major calibre rifles that can fire scramjets, but without the impenetrable nanoplate armour, then they'd be more like battlecruisers. Essentially. My personal recommendation would be for some power to revive the concept of the Deutschland-class type 'Pocket Battleship' in a limited role. Knowing they'd be testbed platforms, but would be one that actually has a technical function outside weapons testing. It answers the NGFS issue handily, would be a capable strike platform, and would still be a somewhat capable escort for Carrier duty or whatever - you could slot it into anywhere you'd slot a Tico.

>>17152 It's just wishful thinking on my part, but I can see the potential market for a battlecruiser in Southeast Asia; if, let's say, a naval architect with a similar disposition to Gerald Bull sells the idea to an eccentric leader like Duterte or Rama X. A division of ship that can shrug off 5" gunfire, Harpoons, and torpedoes would be effectively invulnerable to most navies of the region. They of course need a very strong AA suite and CIWS, but the air forces there are also not that gigantic for the most part. And you don't even need scramjet missiles to destroy naval bases and airfields, good old shells work fine for that. Those ships could spearhead an invasion or single-handedly repel an enemy landing force. This alone could lead to something like the South American Dreadnought race, and bigger navies might take notice of these developments. Shina would have to be interested, considering that they might face those ships if they try to claim all those waters as theirs. Taiwan might also see the potential in battlecruisers or battleships that can significantly damage an attacking PLAN fleet. South Korea should appreciate naval gunfire if they remember the Korean war. And Japan might just try to rediscover the Yamato spirit by building a new Yamato.

>>17162 Would there be a market for CNT monitors in the Baltic Sea? CCs would be vulnerable to land-based AShM spam there and I doubt any country in the region save for Russia if they somehow manage to unfuck their economy has the determination, resources and shekels to build a full size CNT BB.

>>17186 Maybe. But I think larger ships are discouraged in the baltic due to the difficulty in pursuing ASW operations in that area (or so I'm told). Not much use for a crusier if it gets whacked by a sub right out of port.

>>17186 Well no, not really. If ashm-spam won't kill it then torpedo-swarms will.

US Navy tries it; Cultural revolution demoralization. >“Sometimes I think we care more about whether we have enough diversity officers than if we’ll survive a fight with the Chinese navy.” >“The Navy treats warfighting readiness as a compliance issue,”said one career commander. “You might even use the term compliance-centered warfare as opposed to adversary-centered warfare or warfighter-centered warfare.” >One career surface warfare officer said, “I’ve never heard anyone in any [congressional] testimony that I can think of that talks about actually winning. >“[Admirals] are supposed to lead us into battle but they hide in foxholes at the first sight of Military.com and the Military Times,” said one intelligence officer with disgust. “The reporters are in charge, not us.” >No one would ever expect an aviator to land a planeon a flight deck or a submarine officer to dive the boat after a few weeks of reading content on 23 Compact Discs (CDs), but the Navy did exactly that with the surface warfare wardroom starting in 2003 1BD or 4 DVD's makes an officer. >It is estimated that getting an F-18E/F Hornet pilot from commissioning to the fleet squadron could cost as much as $3 million to $4 million dollars. Getting a SWO to the fleet in some of these plans was often less than $30,000 or $40,000, or roughly 1% as expensive. Submarine officer initial training is not as expensive as aviation training but it is a world away from 40k. In terms of timelines to the fleet, aviators take anywhere from 18 to 24 months in pipeline training, submarine officers take 18 to 21 months, while surface warfare officers have often considered 6 months in the pipeline excessive. >As one officer remembered, “We gave ensigns boxes of CDs and told them to train themselves between watches, and that was a colossal failure.” >on a cruiser where…we knew that the fuel tank tops in one of the machinery spaces, that if we did the ultrasonic testing (UT) on that space, that then the safety requirements would require us to replace the tank tops. We didn't have the budgets to do the tank tops, so we didn't do the UT. And then it wasn't until we went into the shipyard and we were doing the required cleaning of the tanks, which that was a requirement under the package, then all of a sudden, one of the shipyard workers goes up and goes, ‘Oh, I see sunlight through this tank top.’ Jesus christ.

>>17268 The USN is a cautionary tale of what happens when you reach the technological level of literally pressing the I win button.

>>17268 >>17268 Imagine being so decadent you have nothing to do but sit on a floating metal island making up problems for yourself to justify your existence.

>>17268 This addresses the issue of skillsets in order to command, but it doesn't address the issue of command. As it stands, a ship head's command is law across the entire ship. That's how the Airforce and private airlines used to run in regards to their aircraft and it was the #1 point of failure that lead to everyone's deaths for about 50 years until new standards were made that required the pilot to confirm orders with his crew before performing maneuvers. Until something similar is done in the Navy in regards to other members of the bridge having the power to intervene when the captain makes a bad call, the wanton death and destruction will continue. >>17269 The "I win" button doesn't even work any more if we go by maneuvers the Iranians have used to capture or turn back US forces in recent years.

>>17268 Somali pirate highjackings of USN DDGs soon?

>>17271 >issue of command Issue of command is irrelevant if your fucking jucos can't bother to talk because two women got in a verbal spat and one's in charge of the CIC and the other is the radar watch officer. That was the ultimate cause of the 7th fleet going VBIED on cargo tankers. You gotta solve both problems or you're 10/10 fucked. There's also times where it looks like a bad idea it usually is but somehow accidentally turns out to be genius in hindsight, after all, luck is a important component in land warfare (less so in naval). Ex: McCellean's cautiousness in Antietam or Joe Johnson showing up at first Manassas reinforce and turn the flank are great examples. From what I hear the SUBCOM group is generally more competition, you tend to get pushed out very fast if you fucking can't do your job as a helmsman or sonarman since the chance of everyone on board dying goes up real fast.

>>14032 I've found this training film about draining. https://yewtu.be/watch?v=FRKcwmqebR4

>>17152 >to revive the concept of the Deutschland-class type 'Pocket Battleship' in a limited role. Would an all-forward armament work for that, or is that also one of the many questions up in the air? And would it work as a surface raider? It looks like even the smallest navies have at least some ASW capabilities, but even the bigger ones are not prepared to deal with ships that have superior firepower and protection to the current standard. Of course they'd respond *assuming that the voters want to spend money on their safety**, but that response would be part of an ongoing arms race anyway.

>>17399 >Would an all-forward armament work for that, or is that also one of the many questions up in the air? Would it work? Absolutely, it could. At the end of the day when it comes to that, it's a matter of preference, since the issue of angling is unlikely to come up anymore since the days of short-range pursuit naval surface combat are gone until true stealth becomes a thing. I just tend to prefer 1A1 over 2A0 (or 2A1 over 3A0) due to weight distribution. All-Forward designs do have the advantage of being able to share magazines between the turrets, which can reduce overall weight. >And would it work as a surface raider? You would need a specialist design for it, really. In today's time, for a proper Surface Raider you'd want to get as close to true stealth as you could - something similar to what the Zumwalt was originally intended to be before the AGS was added to it and ruined everything. Particularly for a large ship that would be operating close-in, things such as Aerial Reconnaissance or Satellites would be able to provide enough general reconnaissance on the ship to put AShMs on its trail in short order. This is why CVs attempt to maintain as much range as they reasonably can and launch strikes from long ranges - this puts valuable time between any retaliation and impact, which vastly increases the potential locations the CV could be at by the time any retaliation strike arrives. As a pure strike platform, however, such a long-ranged gun 'cruiser' would be essentially replacing the CV in that role, either allowing the CV to focus on other roles or giving nations which cannot afford CVs access to that capability in the first place; and, of course, they could take advantage of nearly every trick that CVs do to avoid retaliation strikes as well.

>>17413 >1A1 over 2A0 (or 2A1 over 3A0) Does the A stand for aft, or is it just a meaningless placeholder? >1A1 Now that I think about it, if such a ship had at least one turret with 8" guns, a few secondaries in the 4"-6" range, and then some autocannons in the 37mm-57mm range, then it would look like somebody tried to make a 21th century pre-Dreadnought. >All-Forward designs do have the advantage of being able to share magazines between the turrets, which can reduce overall weight. My logic here is that the better part of a century passed since the last ship with big guns was built, and so it's safer to concentrate all the ˝problematic areas˝ into one place, especially in what is essentially a training ship for engineers. For example, if they underestimate the blast effect of the main guns and have to rearrange some equipment then they will only have to worry about that area in the front, and they won't end up moving something into the blast effect of the rear guns. Or if some of the machinery of the turrets turns out to be flawed, then I can see it being simpler to rip out only one end of the ship instead of both. And maybe you can even save some space if the barrels of the rear guns hang over the front turret.

>>17531 >Does the A stand for aft, or is it just a meaningless placeholder? It stands for Amidships. 2A1 and other similar designations is just one of the multiple American notation systems for Ship gun layouts, as compared to the British's more specific ABXY system since the Americans were never particular on the placements of their turrets/gun housings to begin with. Thus 2A1 such as the NoCo/SoDak/Iowas is 2 Fore Turrets-Amidships-1 Aft Turret. It got more complicated when you introduced centerline secondaries or amidships turrets, resulting in things such as the New York-class' 2 Fore Turrets-1 Amidships Turret-2 Aft Turrets, which was rendered as 2A1A2, or the Yamato, which was rendered as 2.1A1.1. But to be clear, the Americans never really had a unified notation system for this sort of thing, officially spelling out the entire thing (3 Turrets, 2 Fore, 1 Aft), and this short notation instead differed firm by firm. >then it would look like somebody tried to make a 21th century pre-Dreadnought. Which if you were trying to create the a Shore Bombardment platform would not be a bad idea in the first place. >My logic here is that... Okay, that makes sense. I would personally still go for 1A1 set ups since my interest is in regaining the industrial capacity to produce these types of ships, and if you did it right any problems with the turret could be solved by simply lifting the turret out of the barbette and replacing it. But I am seeing the merit in what you propose.

>>17533 >short notation Well, it's still handier than writing Dunkerque-style or Deutschland-style every time, and I guess we can ignore the secondaries. Although I really like the layout of the N3, but if I understand correctly there is no point in designing something similar with today's propulsion technologies. >set ups I'm just wildly speculating here, but assuming the big guns are what we intend to put on the proper battleships, would the best way be to build one such pocket battleship, fix all the teething problems and add some minor upgrades, then build a repeat the design with all those improvements; and finally stretch it into a 2A1 battlecruiser (maybe with more secondaries), and also build a pair of those? Therefore it doesn't really matter if the first two ships have a 1A1 or 2A0 layout, because they are just a stepping stone. And then also develop 3 and 4 guns turrets, and have some great debate if the first proper battleships with nanoplate armour should have a 2A1 layout with three-gun turrets or a 2A0 layout with four-gun turrets.

>>17535 >I understand correctly there is no point in designing something similar with today's propulsion technologies. Pretty much correct. There really wasn't any particular reason to as early as the 1930s, either, but today's tech has made it entirely pointless unless you're desperately trying to avoid any traces of IEP. >I'm just wildly speculating here You're correct in what the idea is. That's the proper 'safe' way to work an industry back up into a lost (or completely new) capability or technology, by steps not by leaps. Otherwise, you end up with the Zumwalt and/or LCS fiascoes. Even the Iowas (/what would have been the Montanas) were preceded by the North Carolinas and South Dakotas as prototypes, and even they were derived from the Heavy Cruisers the USN loved so much - that's the reason why the USN Fast Battleships have Cruiser hullforms. Really, you could build the thing using smaller guns as a start, say multi-gun turreted 5in or 8in/203mm guns as a starting place, basically starting with a Heavy Cruiser before advancing to the Pocket Battleship or Battlecruiser, but actually selling that to a political body in charge of funding would be optimistic on the best of days. As for Secondaries in the American notation system, some firms actually did include the secondaries in the shorthand (leading to some references such as 2A0.5eA1 for the Iowas), but in general the shorthand was for the quickest glance at the centerline layout since that was considered the most important part, and adding the non-centerline secondaries was usually considered to be defeating the point. When they were getting into greater details, they would refer to the layouts by 'names' (which often seemed arbitrary) for even the main battery - chaser (2A1 with Turret #2 superfiring), lancer (as chaser but where the #3 turret could engage over the shoulder), runner (1A2 with Turret #2 superfiring over #3), evens (2A2, Turrets #2 and #3 superfiring over #1 and #4 respectively), all-forward (2/3A0), flat (any number of turrets on the main deck, these being the Deutschlands and Gangut as the only examples off the top of my head) and so on. For secondaries, they used terms such as 'Hex', 'Square', 'Diamond', 'Broadsides', and 'Cruiser' (which ironically was used by the Fast Battleships) to convey the general layout - all names descended from earlier main battery layouts, incidentally.

>>17538 >multi-gun turreted 5in or 8in/203mm guns as a starting place I can see how the former would work, but correct me if I'm wrong. So, dust off the plans of the Worcester-class, fit it out with all the bells and whistles of a modern warship, redesign the triple turrets for 155mm guns that work with standard NATO ammunition, and also equip it with Mk57-style peripheral VLS cells (but they should be redesigned Mk41 cells that can work with all the available missiles for that). The missiles would be the main armament against surface targets, and the 155mm DP guns' main job would be to clear the skies of any enemy missile or aircraft that wanders too close. So in a ship-to-ship missile duel they'd have a good chance to win simply by destroying most of the enemy missiles, and the armour would help them survive a few hits. And even if the game changes to big guns firing scramjet missiles at everything not underwater, they'd still have a job as the modern incarnations of the Atlanta-class AA cruisers. But what would be the job of a cruiser with 203mm guns? Those are too small to launch scramjets, yet they might be just too big to be proper DP guns. A cruiser with 155mm guns wouldn't rock the boat as much, because it would mostly function like other modern warships, just with a significantly stronger gun armament. But for the 203mm cruiser those guns might be just deadweight outside of shore bombardment, and you don't need that many such guns for that job anyway. And I don't think you could sell the idea of chasing enemy ships to shoot them up with heavy guns if both sides have much longer-ranged missiles. I imagine it's possible to develop a turret with two 203mm guns that fits into the same turret ring, and then replace one or two 155mm turrets for a mixed armament. So, what am I missing here?

>>17570 >Modernized, Upgraded Worcester That could actually work, I had been thinking purely of an upgraded Juneau-class with a battery of 5in/62cal guns capable of using present or reasonable proposed 5in shells (such as Vulcano and Super-DART). >But what would be the job of a cruiser with 203mm guns? Shore Bombardment, Surface Warfare, Anti-Air, Anti-Submarine, Special-Operations Support, showing the flag, carrying an Admiral around. Could be basically anything, really. There's actually nothing stopping an 8in gun from being used as a DP gun anymore, firerate (12rpm) and all-angle loading were solved with the 8in/55cal Mk71 MCLWG all the way back in 1975. Design a Super-DART for the 8in and I see no reason why it couldn't be used in the AA role. In effect, consider that anything a smaller shell can be designed for, an 8in shell can also be designed for, so long as the rate of fire (again, 12rpm) is sufficient... which, considering the old arm-launchers are still in service in the world (Taiwan), 6sec/shot must be good enough for some people. Tie this in with the effective muzzle velocity of an enlarged version of a sabotted AA shell (such as the aforementioned Super-DART) and you basically have your 'high velocity projectiles' without even trying. >And I don't think you could sell the idea of chasing enemy ships to shoot them up with heavy guns if both sides have much longer-ranged missiles. Consider that if you are fielding ships that can shoot down the enemy's missiles so effectively that they will be very quick to build their own versions (rapid fire gun technology is no secret to anybody, really), meaning they too will be able to shoot down your missiles just as effectively. Once this form of parity is reached, given the rapid increases in short-range detection capabilities to counter 'stealth missiles', the only effective Anti-Ship weapon becomes... a gun with shells that cannot be effectively shot down, which starts at around the 8in mark for HE shells (recall, 155mm shells are stopped cold by C-RAM and HELs already). Of course, we don't actually even need to reach into exotic gun-toting ships to reach this form of parity, HELs are already rapidly pushing us there and all sides of any prospective naval conflict in the future are already well on their way to developing practical HELs as CIWS or greater forms of AA. Sooner or later, a return to Gun is inevitable.

>>17538 >IEP What's that?

>>17584 Integrated Electrical Propulsion. In essence, it's any propulsion system that translates the force generated at the prime mover (engine/genset) to the drive unit (before your screw/propeller/wheels) by way of electrical impetus (wires->motors) instead of kinetic impetus (drive trains/shafts->gearboxes). Borrowing a few terms that are technically incorrect, but get the point across, of course. This is mostly silly in land vehicles as the benefits are so minor as to be insignificant, but on naval vessels it allows the engines to run almost purely at peak efficiency by way of battery storage as well as better compartmentalization due to reduced major penetrations of bulkheads.